Frontex as the Institutional Reification of the Link between Security, Migration and Border Management

Matthieu Chillaud

Introduction

Security issues very often have the effect of being a driving force for the integration of communities. This is unquestionably true for the European Union (EU), which has seen entire populations move under the lens of security considerations. The relationship between migration[1] and security became increasingly entwined, to the point that some disciplines of political science, chiefly migration studies and security studies, structured themselves around each of them. In that sense, we are getting closer and closer to the point of internalisation of international relations (security topics) and internationalisation of internal political order, because of external concerns. Moreover, in the field of social sciences, a certain reference has argued that migration issues were securitised against the backdrop of European integration. Some scholars, essentially those who claim to be representatives of Critical Security Studies, have indeed shown the slow process from politicisation to the securitisation of migration issues presented as a security threat[2]. Among them is Didier Bigo (France), who is a major leader of an extremely prolific research program[3]. He has carried out *inter alia* numerous empirical surveys by showing the practice of security agents and has denounced, on behalf of emancipating cognitive interest, the practices of those who securitise by securitising. Unlike the Copenhagen School, which points the 'speech acts' in the process of securitisation — "*it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one*" (Wæver 2004) — Bigo (2000: 347) insists on the 'securitising practice' of the 'securitising actor.' Furthermore, according to Bigo, the concept of societal 'security' developed by the same Copenhagen School is rather critical, since this notion tends to perpetuate intolerance towards others, especially since 9/11[4]. Democracies, by means of using the concept of 'societal security,' have developed a kind of 'state of exception,' being both a liberty-killer, and instilling a worrying fear and anxiety, via speech, among their populations in order to force them to obey[5]. He argues (2005: 72) that the 9/11 "*has by no means created a new agenda. The policies after September 11 remain along the exact same lines of the previous twenty years of active anti-immigrant rhetoric and its connection with terrorism and crime. But the politicians and the professionals of security have used these events (…) to overcome the resistance concerning rights of foreigners and to try to create 'a state of exception*". His thesis, influenced by Foucault's notion of 'governmentality' — the 'art of government' in a broad sense — points to the emergence of the rhetoric regarding risks and security, influenced by specific agents such as ministries of interior and other bureaucracies with police control (customs, border, organised crime units, traffic, illegal immigration), that extended their surveillance capacity (Bigo 1998: 13–38, Bigo 2002: 63–92 and Bigo, Bonelli and Delcombe 2008).

This article presents the argument that the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU, known as Frontex (for ***Frontières extérieures***), set up in 2004[6] and which intends to ensure a "*uniform and high level of control and surveillance, which is a necessary corollary to the free movement of persons*" (Council Regulation 2004), shows the relevance of securitisation theories by combining the two perspectives at the interface of the discourse and the practice. We set out to clarify how the emphasis is placed on protecting Europe via Frontex managing external borders. The process of securitisation of migration is not born *ex nihilo* along with Frontex. We argue nevertheless that Frontex tends to support this process. Indeed, there is no consensus on the question of whether Frontex is the institutional response to the process of securitisation of migration. Thus, in his seminal article on Frontex, Neal (2009: 334), going against the tide, takes an original perspective by arguing that "*although the responses to 9/11 issued by the key EU institutions made clear 'securitising' links between terrorism, security, migration and borders, Frontex was not the outcome of that securitisation, but rather of its failure. The creation of Frontex was not the urgent and exceptional policy that the logic of securitisation theory would expect*". However, it is worth pointing out that he has focused on the origins of Frontex rather than its practices after its establishment. We argue that it is not only in the context of an ongoing debate about liberty and security, sparked off chiefly in the wake of 9/11 that the issue of security, migration and borders, that lead to the creation of Frontex, but it is also, and even above all, in the practice of the agency that the process of securitisation of the migrant was intensified.

This paper is broken down into three sections. It opens with an assessment of the construction of the triumvirate of migration, security and border management. More specifically, we shall deal with the following question: how did the genesis of the internal security of the EU shape the links between these three issues? Afterwards, we shall study how Frontex, in its discourse as well as in its practice, contribute to the securitisation of migration. Last, but not least, we shall examine the way Frontex's activities tend to espouse the geopolitical *aggiornamento* of Europe caused, at its borders, both by its successive enlargements and political events mainly in its south.

Internal security, immigration and border management

It would be an understatement to argue that the conception of security has henceforth lost its purely military sense as the EU, in the European Security Strategy (2003: 7), pointed out: "*In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means*". If it is widely accepted that military issues have taken a back seat to strategic studies, it does not mean that there is an exclusive definition of the notion of security. It is still an '*undeveloped concept*' according to Buzan's expression (Buzan 1991: 7)[7]. It vacillates between the logic of adaptation and the logic of reaction, and is constantly being defined and re-defined within theories and applied to new contexts. Moreover, this is precisely what has happened with the internal security of the EU and, subsequently, immigration issues. In his intriguing study on the evolving notion of security against the background of migration issues in the EU, Jef Huysmans (2006), in regards to that, assesses with acuity how government and public approaches to security are generated, the contextual conceptualisation of security itself, and how these definitions correspond with governmental and administrative security techniques.

Coherent with its initial aim since its establishment — the more it has sought to promote freedom of movement of persons within it, the more it has tried to strengthen its external borders — the setting-up of Frontex contributes, in many regards, to the blurring of the concept of European security that is at the same time external and internal. A crucial element in the merging of internal and external security, labelled 'the security *continuum*'[8] (Bigo 1994) has been the re-classification of undocumented immigrants and asylum-seekers as problems of security[9] (Anderson and Apap, 2002). In his in-depth article, Mehmet Ugur (1995) brilliantly shows how immigration had been gradually politicised since the mid-1980s. The political construction of migration, increasingly referred to by the destabilising effects of migration on domestic integration and to the dangers to public order, implies: "*migration has been increasingly presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability*" (Huysmans 2000: 752). Throughout Europe, migrants have been viewed more and more as ‘presumptively deviant’, a perception accentuated by 9/11[10].

In the context of EU integration, there has undeniably been a construction of the concept of security in the framework of border issues. Delimited, watched and protected, the European external border has been more and more in the European security agenda (Hills, 2006). The concept of the ‘(illegal) immigrant’ emerged with the creation of the term ‘border,’ intimately related to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. It is true that, in principle, the issue of border management, which lies very close to the core of the nation-state, is the last resort of sovereign countries. What is new in the European case is that, for the first time, an entity — the EU — which is not a state, has to manage borders in order to regulate its internal security. After establishing the free movement of people that came about with the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the subsequent Schengen Convention in 1990, which initiated the abolition of border controls between participating countries, it became necessary to develop cooperation for managing external borders. Additionally, the EU was to make up a deficit of legitimacy: since travel within the EU was an attribute of European citizenship, improving internal security would enhance the feeling of belonging to a common community.

Internal security was already on the agenda of the EU in the mid-1970s with the creation of TREVI in order to fight terrorism[11]. However, the history of internal security in Europe has been constructed particularly around the project of freedom of movement. If, on the one hand, it was to accelerate the feeling of belonging to a similar community, on the other hand, it amplified migratory phenomena and the organised criminality that would be linked to it. The political project of the European construction without borders would be bound to fail if its citizens simultaneously felt an increase of insecurity. Accordingly, in order to reconcile freedom and security — which was, in fact, mainly in order to make up for a security deficit — this freedom of movement was accompanied by so-called ‘compensatory’ measures (the ‘Schengen standards’), including better coordination between border guards, police and judicial authorities in order to safeguard internal security. The achievement of the principle of freedom of movement within a space without borders altered the approach of state members in the realm of security. The management of external borders was subsequently seen as a complementary and symmetrical measure to the principle of freedom of movement. Reflecting a growing concern facing illegal immigration and organised crime — successive EU documents have jointly addressed both — thus, the issue of European external borders became more and more significant in the European agenda.

The Maastricht Treaty communitarised this new field mainly in its Third Pillar. For the first time, European states accepted a disconnection from their national framework in some of the policies linked to security. Additionally, the internal security of the EU that had so far been a means to facilitate the free movement of persons was becoming an end in itself. It was with the Treaty of Amsterdam that the Community acquired powers for the regulation of external borders, through the transfer of policies from the Third Pillar to Title IV EC — it enacted a partial and gradual shift from intergovernmentalism to a more communitarised approach — and the transformation of the Schengen acquis into European law (Kostakopoulou, 2000). This incorporation was a significant step in the establishment of a borderless '*area of freedom, security and justice*'[12]. In 1999 EU cooperation on migration, asylum and external borders received an important impetus with the adoption of the 'Tampere Programme' — European states agreed that a common policy was an onus for monitoring the then external land and maritime borders — a five-year work programme for the development of internal security policies in the EU. By writing that the Union had "*to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes*" (Tampere European Council 1999), the conclusions of the European Council tended to formalise *de jure* the triad of 'security — migration — borders.'

Establishment and Functioning of Frontex

While the idea of setting up an agency in the framework of the Schengen Acquis, which is in charge of the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states of the EU, was realised, Frontex seems to have been created in an arduous way (Corrado 2006). Contentions and even failures alternated until 2004. This tends to support Neal's argument, according to which there were neither emergency nor extraordinary means in the dynamic of creation of Frontex: "*What unfolded between 2001 and 2003 was a process of negotiation, accommodation and compromise between the Commission and the Council, and in turn a process of negation, accommodation and compromise between the Member States within the Council*" (Neal 2009: 340). On the other hand, the 'state of exception' has seen a myriad of initiatives including the notion of 'emergency.' For instance, The Hague Programme referred to a 'new urgency' of security: "*The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004*" (Council of the European Union, 8 December 2004).

It is in this uncertain and hectic context that Frontex's missions were defined, the primary ones being to help EU member states implement EU rules on external border controls and to coordinate operational cooperation in the field of external border management. Its role is limited to providing support and expertise. Its activities are supplementary to those undertaken by the member states. None of the operations it conducts are done in its own name. It has some competences to coordinate joint operations at the air, land and sea external borders. These operations can be proposed by member states or initiated by the agency itself in agreement with the member state concerned, and bring together staff from various member states. Furthermore, it has the mission of assisting in the training of national border guards. It also conducts risk analysis[13], in order to *inter alia* reduce the emergency feature of migratory crises. Indeed, as Sergio Carrera points out (2007: 12): "*FRONTEX's activities are, in most cases, 'emergency-driven'.*"

The agency is above all 'technical' in the sense that its mandate does not allow it to participate in European policy in the field of border control. However, its activities contribute unquestionably to the process of securitisation since they can be seen as being 'extraordinary.' Not only do their logistics demand cutting-edge organisation, but also the issue of their 'legality' can be questioned[14]. For that matter, Frontex has very often been a target for criticism, especially by human rights activists and pro-migrant groups, regarding the way in which the EU's borders are controlled[15]. Furthermore, it seems that the 'military' vocabulary used by Frontex (joint operations, European patrol network, intelligence, etc.) and even the use of maps with representations resembling battle plans have an aim of 'dramatising' the political situation and to give weight to the (security) legitimacy of the agency given the traditional role of military in addressing security issues. Additionally, its role of risk analysis can also be seen as a security practice which contributes to the securitisation of migration since, as Sarah Léonard points out, its "*increasingly sophisticated structures to gather, produce and disseminate amongst EU member states what it calls 'intelligence' on irregular migration*" look more and more as if the "*structures have only traditionally been developed to monitor security threats*" (Léonard 2010: 243).

The practice and the discourse of Frontex would suggest that the lack of security at European borders is high and demands the mobilisation of exceptional measures. These measures are justified by presenting them as humanitarian issues[16]. In that sense, the protection of migrants may be seen as a rhetorical tool for justifying control measures. There is, at the same time, this idea of a necessary united stand against illegal immigration and organised crime. However, the influx of immigrants does not necessarily increase. In his intriguing study that he bluntly titled *The Myth of Invasion*, Hein de Haas (2007) challenges the European discourse according to which the "*only solutions — which invariably boil down to curbing migration — focus on 'fighting' or 'combating' illegal migration through intensifying border controls and cracking down on trafficking and smuggling-related crime (…); although there has been an incontestable increase in regular and irregular West African migration to Europe over the past decade, available empirical evidence dispels most of these assumptions*". For his part, Stephan Dünnwald (2012) argues straightforwardly that as long as European political organs "*hold up the myth of invasion from Sub-Saharan Africa, Frontex will be eager to act within the realms of this perspective, to enhance its competences and close the last gaps for immigrants, analysing tracks and traces of migrants and smugglers*".

The opposite is also true: European states also have the tendency of dramatising the issue of migration, and sometimes pass the buck on to Frontex. On the one hand, migration issues are by nature controversial and likely to be extremely politicised, and on the other hand, Frontex has a technical profile and is almost 'apolitical' since, as we have seen, its mandate does not allow it to participate in a European policy in the field of border control. In such conditions, Frontex may be easily harnessed. Sergio Carrera (2007: 12–13) in his study on the role of Frontex during the Canary migratory crisis in 2006, notices that the Spanish government dramatised the latter and at the same time blamed the EU and Frontex: "*The situation in the Canary Islands was presented at the official level as 'an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the whole of Europe' and as 'a massive invasion of illegal immigrants' and for which an 'urgent European solution' was needed*". Yet, in fact, immigration figures were not "*significantly high when comparing them with the main channels of irregular immigration in the EU, which are not the ones taking place at the maritime borders, but those via international airports*". In all events, Spain succeeded in converting its intensive diplomatic offensive within the EU and Africa[17] for legitimising the three operations of Hera. For Southern European countries, recalling the general acknowledgement of the principles of burden-sharing, solidarity and mutual trust, which are at the heart of Frontex's mission of cooperation of EU member states (Jorry 2007: 2), may be necessary in order to compensate their geopolitical weaknesses.


Frontex and the European External Border (2012)
500 km
Cooperation with Third Countries
In force
Negotiations
ATLANTIC OCEAN
North Sea
Baltic Sea
Warsaw
Frontex Agency
Black Sea
Piraeus
Mediterranean Sea
To Canary Islands
Key
European Union
Schengen Area
Main migratory routes into the UE
Deployment of the first Rabit teams in October 2010
First Frontex Operational Office (FOO) set up in February 2010 which covers the area of Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Malta

Source: author

A Global Strategy on Borders and Migration for a Geopolitical Aggiornamento

The creation of Frontex is the logical consequence of the geo-political upheavals generated by the successive enlargements of the EU and, subsequently, its new frontiers. The Union, which had some concerns about enlargement in the East — a kind of vision of Europe reaching the 'Wild East' — and apprehension concerning the South, had to have at its disposal a means for strengthening its external borders. After Finland joined in 1995, the EU became much closer to Russia, a 'troubled' area. Consequently, the idea of a border separating the last defence of the internal order against external disorders became more and more salient. The 2004 enlargement heightened this feeling; some concerns were voiced about the ability of the newcomers to take the onus that was theirs to effectively control the new European external borders. Frontex was to respond to the concern of Europeans for the security of their '*limes*,' the ones splitting, in the political speech, the European internal security to the external one.

Consequently, it makes sense that the EU has sought to stabilise countries that line its external border. Even in 2003, in the European Security Strategy (ESS), it was pointed out that security, stability and good governance in adjacent neighbourhoods were key foreign policy priorities. "*It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe*" (*A Secure Europe in a Better World* 2003). Generating new challenges in terms of stability (transnational crime, shady trade, irregular immigration, etc.), this neighbourhood, that was in fact a real geopolitical shift, required that the EU sponsor an ambitious strategy that, on the one hand, strengthens effective border management and control over borderlands and, on the other hand, intends good neighbourly cooperation with Russia. In December 2005, the European Council adopted a document called *A Strategy for the External Action of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice*, which emphasised the fact that the internal security of the EU could "*only be successful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries on these issues, which includes strengthening the rule of law, and promoting respect for human rights and international obligations*" (Council of the European Union 2005). The establishment of a 'buffer zone' by means of this European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) at the external border of the EU — the objective being ultimately to establish around Europe's edges a "*ring of friends*" with whom the EU could enjoy "*close, peaceful and co-operative relations*" (*Communication from the Commission to the council …* 2004) — was all the more imperative since dramatic differences in terms of economic development between the southern and the northern shores of the Mediterranean, as well as between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, could accelerate instability and consequently increased risks of floods of migrants. Aware of its power of attraction — income differentials are bound to stay the most powerful magnet for this migration of destitution[18] — the EU has consequently included in the ENP a dimension linked to illegal immigration: the indirect role of its neighbours being *inter alia* to keep third country nationals that the Member States consider undesirable out of the EU.

Europe has a 70,000 km coastline along two oceans and four seas: the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, the Baltic, North, Mediterranean and Black Seas (*Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, …* 2007). However, the major maritime route of illegal immigration is in the Mediterranean area, as well as to a lesser extent in the Atlantic: "*the southern coastlines of the EU face a tremendous influx of migrants that try to enter EU territory illegally by sea via four main routes: first, from West Africa to the Canary Islands, second via the Strait of Gibraltar (including the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla), third from Libya to Malta or Sicily (via Lampedusa), and fourth from Turkey to Greece*" (Demmelhuber 2011: 814). Consequently, most of the agency's maritime missions hitherto have concentrated on that area. Until 2010, they were in the Canaries Islands, in Lampedusa, in Malta and in the Aegean Sea. Afterwards, they concerned the Strait of Sicily and especially Greece. The latter, because of its location at the front line of the EU's external border controls — it is at the gates of the Schengen territory and the common European border — has probably been one of the main significant hubs in terms of illegal immigration. One of the most dramatic manifestations of that geopolitical feature was when Frontex decided, for the first time, to summon the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) (Frontex Press Release 2010), a mechanism that dates back to July 2007[19], after the Greek Government on the 24th of October 2010 sent an urgent call to Brussels for assistance in the control of its external land border with Turkey due to an "*exceptional mass inflow of irregular immigrants.*" That event was bluntly described as a "*humanitarian crisis*" by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR says asylum situation in Greece … 2010). The condition for the RABITs mechanism to be activated is that the requesting member state needs to be facing "*a mass influx of third country nationals attempting to enter its territory illegally.*" (Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 … 2007). It was precisely the case. "*Due to the exceptionally high numbers of migrants crossing the Greek–Turkish land border illegally, Greece now accounts for 90 % of all detections of illegal border crossings to the EU. In the first half of 2010 a total of 45,000 illegal border crossings were reported by the Greek authorities for all their border sectors*" (*Frontex Deploys Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Greece* 2010). The RABITs, which were comprised of border guards from twenty-six European countries, whether full members or associated with Schengen, had the aim of assisting their Greek counterparts for various border-control issues. Additionally, Greece accommodated the first Frontex operational unit in February 2010, in

Piraeus. It covers the area of Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Malta (see map). We should also note its operations during the Arab Spring. A concern shared by some European governments was that a significant number of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers may try to reach Europe. On the 20th of February, 2011, the EU responded to Italy's formal request and launched the Frontex Joint Operation Hermes 2011, mandated to assist Italian authorities in coping with ongoing and prospective migratory flows (Hermes 2011 running) Consequently as a result of the volatile situation in North Africa in general and Libya in particular, the EU extended the operational area of the Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon Sea to include Crete (Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011).

Conclusion

Our paper demonstrates, in the case of Frontex, the suitability of securitisation theories combining the two perspectives at the interface of the discourse and the practice for illuminating the association between security, migration and border controls.

The confusion of public opinion having been basically carried out, as the construction of continuity between migration and terrorism has justified the strengthening of border controls. Between the devil — public opinion used to arbitrate the upholding of repressive measures[20] — and the deep blue sea — the impossibility of being a 'fortress'[21] — the EU seeks to keep its borders closed for some and opened for others. The fact is that experts usually show the benefits of international migration. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its 2009 report, underlines that mobility is an essential actor in human development. Even the EU acknowledges it. In the Green Paper on a European approach to managing economic migration (11 January 2005)[22], the Commission pointed out that "*more sustained immigration flows could increasingly be required to meet the needs of the EU labour market and ensure Europe's prosperity.*" On the one hand, there has been some sharp debates about the expected positive effects of migration in Western countries since a high birth rate deficit and the ageing of the population will have harmful consequences on their well-being. On the other hand, there is still within the EU a very strong unwillingness to 'de-politicise' Frontex. Nonetheless, this reluctance may come from the ambiguity inherent in the method of decision-making, when it concerns immigration issues: intergovernmental or supranational. We should acknowledge that strictly speaking, in the framework of Frontex, one speaks of 'the external borders of member states' even if an 'external' European border replaced 'internal' European borders. It is not a small nuance since European states are still sovereign and, in that regard, the competence of 'borders' is meant as remaining at the heart of their sovereignty. In that regard, the creation of Frontex must be seen as a result of a compromise between the upholders of European migratory control and those who want to preserve their sovereignty. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that some recent developments may bode a reorientation towards more supranationality. Thus the new regulation of October 2011 strengthens its competences (Regulation (EU) No. 1168/2011 …)[23].

Frontex has become the institutional result of the association between security, migration and border controls. However, one can wonder if it is eventually tenable, the growing entwinement between having some repercussions on the respect of fundamental rights. Indeed, the new regulation of October 2011 takes more into account fundamental rights: it explicitly provides that Frontex will fully comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and sets out additional specific fundamental rights obligations with a Code of Conduct *inter alia*. Nevertheless, the implementation of those measures caused doubts among some observers. The European Ombudsman opened, in March 2012, an inquiry into how Frontex implements its fundamental rights obligations.

Notes

[1] If, in principle, 'migration' is an overall term for the movement of people between different countries, whereas 'immigration' refers to people coming to a country, both terms, in this article, might be used interchangeably.

[2] The existing scholarly literature on that point is rather significant. A good overview is made by Guild (2009: 6-10). Let us recall that an issue is securitised when it is elevated from the level of routine political discussion to special-category status. Subsequently, there is a justification for the allocation of the increased resources that are to combat the issue. Threats exist subjectively to the extent they are perceived through the eyes of individuals within a community. Certain political actors – the ones who possess the power and legitimacy to activate a security discourse in a particular field – will seek to mobilise the resources of their community to counter the danger identified as such. (Wæver 1995: 46-86).

[3] See, for instance, all the works made under the supervision of the CHALLENGE, a research project funded by the Sixth Framework Research Programme of DG Research (European Commission) (http://www.libertysecurity.org/index.html). An intriguing overview is made by Bigo, Carrera, Guild and Walker (2007).

[4] Ole Wæver, et al. (1993) elaborated on the concept of 'societal security' based on a loose understanding of groups based on a shared 'we' identity. The security of society *'can be threatened by whatever puts its 'we' identity into jeopardy'*.

[5] See also the fascinating book he co-edited with Bonelli and Delcombe (2008).

[6] The agency, based in Warsaw, became operational on 3 October 2005. It is worth mentioning that it is the first EU agency to be based in one of the new EU states. Let's recall that an EU agency is a decentralised body, distinct from the institutions. With its own legal personality, it is established in order to accomplish specific tasks.

[7] We should note, in addition, that the entry of migration into the realm of high politics is charted by that book amongst the first publications of security studies literature to assess the security threats posed by migration.

[8] The common view, so far, has held that bipolarity upheld a distinction between the realms of 'internal security' (concerned on law and order inside the state) and 'external security' (focused on the defence of states).

[9] There is an excellent study on that score in the intriguing Eriksson and Rhinard (2009).

[10] We should note moreover that although all the terrorists entered the US through legal channels, everywhere new initiatives to control undocumented migration are usually justified as necessary for reducing the risk of terrorism.

[11] TREVI was an intergovernmental network of national officials from the ministries of justice and the interior in the European Community set up in 1975.

[12] The Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 substantially amended the provisions of the articles in Title IV TEC, renamed the title to *'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'* and introduced into EU primary law the concept of an *'integrated management system for external borders'*.

[13] Its mission of risk analysis is carried out by the Risk Analysis Unit that uses, for that purpose, a Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM). *'Frontex monitors the global security environment, especially those political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors that could affect border security. The agency collates data from Member States, EU bodies as well as from public media and other sources within and beyond Europe's borders. Collated data is analysed with the aim of creating as clear a picture as possible of the situation at the EU's external borders'*. (http://www.frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/risk-analysis).

[14] An in-depth discussion on the issue of legality of Frontex activities would go above the scope of the present article. We simply argue here that the problematic issue of legality contributes to the 'extraordinary' feature of Frontex's activities. There is an excellent study on the issue of the legality of Frontex's activities made by Papastavridis (2010).

[15] For instance, in a statement presented at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), several non-governmental organisations (NGO) have expressed their concern that much of the rescue work by Frontex was incidental to a deterrence campaign so undiscriminating that directly and through third countries asylum-seekers are being blocked from claiming protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme 2008).

[16] In answer to the blunt question, *'Does Frontex save lives?'* asked of three Frontex officials during some interviews conducted in Warsaw in August 2012, two said 'yes' and one said 'no.' However, while the last one replied in the negative, it was immediately iterated that it was not Frontex's primary mission, which was in fact coordinating border-guard activities. For him, Frontex indirectly saves lives.

[17] It is probably no coincidence that Spain sponsored the organisation in Morocco of the first Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development, which was held on 10-11 July 2006.

[18] The European commission noticed in 2003 that *'Most of the EU's Southern and Eastern neighbours have a nominal GDP per capita of less than 2000 Euros. Poverty and social exclusion has increased sharply in Russia and the WNIS over the past decade as a result of falling output and increased inequality in the distribution of income. This has led to an increased risk of social and political dislocation (…) Despite the sluggish rate of economic growth, the Mediterranean region has long been characterised by a low level of absolute poverty. Relative poverty is, however, an issue as nearly 30% of the population live on less than \$2 a day and illiteracy rates remain high.'* (*Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament* 2003: 7).

[19] RABITs whose powers include all tasks for border control and surveillance perform their activities in the presence of the border guards of the host Member State. While wearing their own uniform, they will also need to wear a blue armband with the insignia of the EU and the Frontex agency. The RABITs are not intended to provide long-term assistance. See Frontex Press Kit – Rapid Border Intervention Teams (http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachments_News/backgrounder_rabits_english.pdf) for a factual synthesis of RABITs.

[20] Let's notice moreover that the audience, necessary for the securitisation, does indeed exist but is not the highest European concern when it concerns illegal immigration. It is worth to mentioning the Eurobarometer survey on internal security (2011) which provides a detailed analysis of the way in which internal security is perceived both at the EU level and within individual Member States: among the threats identified for the EU security, 'illegal immigration' is (only) the fifth (after 'economic and financial crisis', 'terrorism', 'organized crime' and 'poverty) and for the ones to national security it is (only) the sixth (after 'economic and financial crisis', 'terrorism', 'poverty', 'corruption,' 'petty crime' and ex aequo with 'petty crime').

[21] The predominance of border control as a tool of migration management had fostered harsh criticism among those who accuse EU migration policies of promoting a 'European fortress', according to Geddes' famous expression (2000).

[22] Let's recall that a green paper is a discussion document released by the European Commission. It has for purpose to stimulate debate and to facilitate a process of consultation on a particular topic. It is not a binding document.

[23] It erases the distinction between Rabit teams and the other teams, all of them being henceforth 'European teams of border guards'. It also contains new measures aiming to force states to involve themselves in the long term. A reserve of European border guards is set up annually whereas Frontex can get some materiel on its own behalf.

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