Party Based Euroscepticism: Opposing the Commission or the European Integration?

Petr Kaniok

Abstract: At the close of the 1990s and the beginning of the present century, a series of papers appeared in political science circles, which attempted to capture the phenomenon of Euroscepticism and especially its party manifestations. This effort has lead to total confusion as almost every kind of critique towards the European Integration being considered as a manifestation of Euroscepticism. This article is aimed at reflecting critically upon the existing analysis of party-based Euroscepticism and the subsequent presentation of an alternative typology. The new typology takes into account a broader definition of European Integration as the support for European Integration cannot only be aligned with support for a stronger and deeper Union. Moreover, the proposed typology functions not only with the negative (sceptical) party position to European integration, but also takes into account the positive position, as part of a comprehensive continuum. The typology encompasses three types of potential positions by parties to European integration, which are inserted into the context of paradigms of the European Integration.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Party Politics, Typology, European Union, Approach towards European Integration
1 Introduction

At the close of the 1990s and the beginning of the present century, a series of papers appeared in political science circles, which attempted to capture Euroscepticism and its party manifestations (Taggart 1998; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Conti 2003; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003; Conti and Verzichelli 2004; Riishøj 2004; Flood and Usherwood 2005; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a). The conceptualisation and typologies these papers gave rise to was subject to thinking, which may be labelled cautious at the same time it was unrestrained. The ambition of the following pages is to critically summarize this thinking and make use of it to create a novel conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, or more precisely of the positions of parties toward European integration.

For reasons of space, it is not possible to describe in detail the considerable volume of existing work, which researchers have undertaken in recent years concerning Euroscepticism. At this point it is necessary to make reference to the abundant literature mentioned above. The text summarizes the existing research within a single comparison table, because even a brief description of individual typologies would require an extensive volume by itself.

The abundance of articles and materials, with which case studies could also be grouped (e.g., Batory 2001; Henderson 2001; Lees 2002; Church 2003; Harmsen 2004; Neumayer 2008; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008c), points to the fact that even though research into Euroscepticism is not a long-standing phenomenon, no generally respected typology has been created thus far which has been put into standard use. It is furthermore necessary to stress that this concerns only research into party-based Euroscepticism. Were the text to also take into account so-called public Euroscepticism (Hughes et al. 2002; Sørensen 2008), it would be much more extensive.

This study is divided into several chapters. The first of them, after an introduction to relevant existing typologies, attempts to describe and evaluate them and in the process, point out their problematic areas. Subsequently, problems of understanding the phenomenon of Euroscepticism are discussed. An innovative section of the text, presenting an alternative conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, is based upon the premise that the contemporary form of European integration is not exclusive. In fact no existing text devoted to Euroscepticism has explicitly made note of this fact as a starting point for analysis. The presumption that a positive position towards European integration is also contained in an intergovernmental approach to the EU forms the starting point for the new typology which consists of the categories — Europeanists, Eurogovernmentalists and Eurosceptics. All three proposed categories are introduced; at the end the article suggests further possible research.
2 Question marks over existing typologies

Current research into party-based Euroscepticism has given rise to several typologies, which principally originated as a result of mutual reaction. A short overview of all relevant typologies is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Presentation of Relevant Typologies of Party-Based Euroscepticism

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<tr>
<th>AUTHORS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF TYPOLOGY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak</td>
<td>Hard Euroscepticism is initially defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003: 6) as ‘principled opposition toward the EU and European integration, which results in a demand by the party for exit from the EU. Party policy is directed against the project of European integration as such.’ Soft Euroscepticism is, by contrast, defined (2003: 6) in the sense that ‘insofar as the party is not opposed in principal to the EU and European integration, but it is possible to identify in its platform one or more reservations leading to the expression of qualified opposition toward the EU, the party may be classified as mildly eurosceptical.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Kopecký and Cas Mudde</td>
<td>Kopecký and Mudde’s typology originated as a reaction to the division of Taggart and Szczerbiak given above. In place of stressing support/non-support for membership of the country in the EU, Kopecký and Mudde propose an emphasis on the following two factors: a) the principal of surrender of sovereignty in a direction running from the national state to supranational structures, b) support/opposition regarding further expansion of EU sovereignty (as a current trajectory of European integration). On the basis of positions to these two points the authors propose their own segmentation (2002: 300–304) based upon a two-dimensional model for differentiating relationships to the EU, in which two levels of positions are identified toward integration: that of unfocused support and that of enthusiastic support. The first consists in general support for European integration, the second in support for the EU. On the level of support for the idea of European integration (the European integration dimension), there are Europhiles and Europhobes. Europhiles are convinced that the essential idea of European integration involves institutionalised cooperation on the basis of shared sovereignty as the political element, and an integrated liberal market as the economic element. Europhile representatives may thus be champions of supranationality or may simply be advocates of an open market. The second dimension of the typology of Kopecký and Mudde differentiates between EU optimists and EU pessimists (the current trajectory of integration dimension). EU optimists are in favour of the current state of the EU and are convinced of the correctness of its direction.</td>
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A critical position regarding certain European policies does not mandatorily exclude a particular party from this category, so long as it is satisfied on a general level with the current state of the EU. EU pessimists, by contrast, either do not support the EU in its existing state or have a pessimistic view of its further evolution.

**Scheme of Peter Kopecký and Case Mudde**

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<tr>
<th>Euroenthusiasts</th>
<th>Europragmatists</th>
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<td>• support current EU trajectory</td>
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<th>Eurosceptics</th>
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**Chris Flood and Simon Usherwood**

The typology of Flood and Usherwood (2005: 6) contains six categories. The first category is that of Rejectionists, who oppose membership or even partial participation by the country in policies and institutions. Revisionists, who form the second category, seek to return to an earlier state before the acceptance of an important treaty or the revision of a significant policy. The third category is made up of Minimalists, who accept the current state of the EU but reject any further deepening of integration. Gradualists, as the fourth category, support further integration of either the entire system or some of its individual policies. Integration under this conception should take place as a gradual, directed process. Reformists, the fifth group, may be defined as supporters of a constructive engagement with reform, emphasizing its inevitability and necessity. Members of the group with the most positive attitude to European integration are labelled Maximalists under the typology. They actively support rapid further integration, either of the entire system or some individual policies.

**Nicolo Conti and Luca Verzichelli**

In its definition of eurosceptical positions, the typology of N. Conti and L. Verzichelli (Conti 2003: 17) works with the original concept of hard and soft Euroscepticism offered by A. Szcerbiak and P. Taggart. It must be remarked that Conti and Verzichelli's typology works with the national level of party contests and was constructed with these in mind. The first positive position is functional Europeanism, which takes note of party support for European integration, something that derives from the goal of serving national or party interests, which differ, from the interests of integration. European integration is not a goal itself but contributes to the wider goals of the party: economic stability, modernization of the country, and so on. Evidence of this may also be seen in the orientation of the party toward integration, which will continue only so long as it does not conflict with the interests of the party on the nation. The second, most positive, position is identity Europeanism, which represents principled support for integration. The integration process is not perceived by such
a party from the standpoint of benefits and utility for the national state or the party itself; rather the key target is integration as such and its deepening. In this position, European integration is a good thing in and of itself and must be supported even if that brings costs. An important sign of identity Europeanism is a language, which uses a vocabulary celebrating the EU and its manifestations.

The third approach is that of the neutral (non-specific or unclear) position, which occupies the theoretical middle ground between Euroscepticism and Europeanism. The party for which this is characteristic does not concern itself with integration issues at all or does so only minimally or lacks a clear position toward them. The party’s program documents and the opinions of its leaders do not deal with individual EU policies or do so only marginally.

Hard Euroscepticism represents the most negative position, which a party may adopt towards the European integration process. Such a political party rejects the integration process in its entirety or positions itself very negatively with regard to that which has already been achieved within the European integration framework. The remedy for this state of affairs is seen by the party to lie exclusively in a new model of cooperation. Reform of the existing integration model is viewed as insufficient. The party proposes the exit of ‘its’ country from the EU, or repeated and extensive transfer of competency from the supranational level to the level of the national state. The rhetoric of party spokespersons is marked by its decidedly protest-oriented (anti-European) character.

The fifth position under this typology is soft Euroscepticism. In this case, the objection does not concern the project of European integration itself, but rather focuses on the negative reaction of the political party to some of the results of European integration (some EU policies or the EU’s institutional setup or what the party views as negative fallout from European integration on the domestic system). The differentiation of soft Euroscepticism from hard lies in the fact that soft Euroscepticism by a political party allows for reform of the EU as a path to alleviating critical insufficiencies. The approach to European integration thus lacks the radicalism present in parties, which express hard Euroscepticism. Among integration paradigms, soft Euro sceptic political parties are close to intergovernmentalism; party policies are oriented towards the achievement of the party’s preferred goals.

The reaction of Taggart and Szczerbiak to the above typologies was a redefinition of the concept of soft and hard Euroscepticism (2003: 12).

In its revised conception, such a hard Euroscepticism entails: ‘principled opposition towards the project of European integration in the form of the EU, especially in the sense of rejecting the transference of power to supranational institutions.’

The second subtype of Euroscepticism is soft Euroscepticism, which entails ‘the absence of a principled critique of the EU but the presence of opposition towards the contemporary or planned trajectory, involving an expansion of the competency and sovereignty of the EU.’
An interesting and very detailed typology was conceived by the Danish political scientist Søren Riishøj (Riishøj 2004). His classification starts from positions similar to the original classification of Taggart and Szczerbiak. The result, however, is a different scale, which works not so much with the extent of Euroscepticism as with the origin of the notion itself. Riishøj proposes, e.g., identity Euroscepticism (it centres on the divergence between the national identity and the European identity. Riishøj ascribes this position to parties who fear that the European identity will engulf the national identity), functional Euroscepticism (concerns Euroscepticism which originates in opposition to a particular concrete policy of the EU, e.g., the common agricultural policy) or institutional Euroscepticism (projection of the conflict centring on the legitimacy of European versus national institutions. A low level of trust in political institutions of the national state may in his opinion lead to an increase of trust in the EU, and vice versa). Altogether, Riishøj mentions nine possible types of Euroscepticism.

Source: Author, on the basis of Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Flood and Usherwood 2005; Conti 2003 and Riishøj 2004

None of the established typologies has any problem in principle with the definition of hard Euroscepticism. It may be noted that the authors who originally delineated hard from soft Euroscepticism, Szczerbiak and Taggart, along with, e.g., Conti and Verzichelli, agree on the fact that hard Euroscepticism centres on the rejection in principle of the integration process as a whole including, as is clear from the concrete policies of hard Eurosceptic parties¹, a demand for exit from the EU of the country in question or a rejection of the existence of a supranational political entity based upon the transfer of political power from the national state to the supranational entity and a further increase in such transfers.

The Eurorejects of Kopecký and Mudde, along with Flood and Usherwood’s rejectionist category, also conform to the criteria for hard Euroscepticism. Summarizing all these definitions, with an emphasis on the revised conception of Szczerbiak and Taggart, we may characterize hard Euroscepticism as a policy deriving from principled opposition to the project of European integration, as based upon the notion of political power transfer from the national state to the supranational body. In this sense, the concept of hard Euroscepticism makes for a consistent and logical term, verifiable in the long-term, which corresponds to the position of the party.

A difficulty nevertheless arises if we move to a category or categories with which the existing models attempt to capture the softer version of opposition to European integration. What is important is that this is also labelled an expression of Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003: 12; Conti 2003: 16; Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 304), which evokes a proximity between soft and hard Euroscepticism. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks directly refer to the Euroscepticism as a ‘term expressing doubt or
disbelief in Europe and European integration in general...encompassing a range of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition' (Hooghe and Marks 2007: 120). In other words: hard Euroscepticism is a logical continuation of soft Euroscepticism, with all possible implications of such treatment.

However, several reservations against this approach may be stated, especially with regard to the definition of soft Euroscepticism. The first, unfortunately fundamental, reservation concerns the absence of a definition for a pro European stance in most of the existing typologies. How can Euroscepticism and its forms (if there are any) be conceptualised without existence of a clear and accepted definition of the positive approach? This note is relevant especially in the case of soft Euroscepticism and its position vis-à-vis European values. Taggart and Szczerbiak, in their revised definition of hard and soft Euroscepticism, together with Conti and Kopecký and Mudde define soft Euroscepticism (or Euroscepticism as such) as agreement in principle with the process of European integration. They consider disagreement by adherents of this position with the current trajectory of EU development to be an expression of Euroscepticism, or better put, disagreement with further expansion of the competency of EU institutions. But is it possible to speak of a position defined by concurrence with the notion of European integration as a process in which political power is transferred from the national state to the supranational body, as one of Euroscepticism? Even if it does not agree with the current conception of this body and does not agree with expansion of its legal powers?

Other reservations centre on the individual typologies. As it concerns Kopecký and Mudde typology, the most problematic type seems to be the europragmatic category. It is obviously difficult to conceive of a political party simultaneously opposing European integration as a project and supporting its current trajectory. Although Lubomír Kopeček (2004: 246), who points out its problematic nature, maintains that it is not completely out of the question that particular political parties will conform to its criteria in the future, it is difficult to envision how this would happen. The europragmatic category appears to be untenable and fails the test as a representative of the soft version of Euroscepticism.

Soft Euroscepticism as defined by Conti and Vezichelli and its differentiation from the hard version has problems of its own. It is evident from Conti’s and Vezichelli’s typology that it works with the original Taggart and Szczerbiak definition. Italian authors are thus not able to avoid the original excessively wide definition of soft Euroscepticism and resign themselves to the inclusion of a revised conception of Euroscepticism in their model. In relation to certain typologies (those of Conti and Vezichelli; Kopecký and Mudde; Flood and Usherwood) one may completely agree with Taggart and Szczerbiak’s observation (2008b: 246), that the better developed and more finely gradated a typology is, the more restricted its utility in operationalizing and categorizing political parties.
To the above admonition, it may be added that care was sacrificed in some spots, as were some individual viewpoints on the problem, in the interest of creating an attractive typology, which captures every position. This is especially apparent in the typology of Riishøj. In places his classification is noteworthy and inspiring, but unfortunately it is difficult to generalize from and use as a model. What’s more, a simple classification based upon the prevailing themes of opposition to the EU need not speak at all to the presence of Euroscepticism. It is likely that a consistent application of Riishøj’s typology would enable one to arrive at a classification of the great majority of relevant political parties (in at least some of their developmental phases) as Eurosceptics.

With regard to Szczerbiak and Taggart’s remark about the harm an over-refined typology might do, it is of course open to question whether the same words might not be applicable to the existing division of Euroscepticism. Defining soft Euroscepticism in the way Taggart and Szczerbiak or Kopecký and Mudde have done gives rise to the danger that positions, which rather reflect the conflict between adherents of supranational and intergovernmental conceptions of European integration, will be categorized under Euroscepticism. In the case of Conti’s and Verzichelli’s definition of soft Euroscepticism on the basis of, among other things, the ambitions of its adherents to reform the EU, the threat of confusion is more than clear. The gap between reform and rejection is, in any event, pretty wide. Including soft and hard Euroscepticism under one label is thus not only a linguistic problem.

Conceptualisation of the Euroscepticism in way of Conti and Verzichelli, Taggart and Szczerbiak or Hooghe and Marks (mixing doubt and rejection) is acceptable to a certain extent only upon the supposition that the sole admissible model of European integration is one based upon federalist or neo-functionalist theories of European integration. From this position it becomes evident that Euroscepticism involves not just a rejection of the idea of the origin of an organization with supranational legal powers of the character of the EU (hard Euroscepticism) but also rejection or criticism of federalist and neo-functionalist conceptions of integration (soft Euroscepticism). Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson point out that conservative and neoliberal political parties tend to support European integration in so far as this leads to the regime competition within an integrated market. Consequently, European integration should focus on market integration, though it is recognised that some minimal political superstructure is necessary (Marks and Wilson 2000: 444–445). Therefore these parties are more reserved to the process of rapid political integration — but does this necessary mean that they are Eurosceptical? Or using different words — does this fact means that the only sole admissible model of European integration — also for political science — goes in hand only with the ideology of, e. g., socialist parties?

At the same time, the historical evolution of European integration demonstrates that over the long-term precisely the reverse prevails, with the integration process
always having arisen from the conflict between politicians opting either for supranational or intergovernmental ways of integration. One can argue that long lasting mutual power conflict between the Council of the EU on the intergovernmental side and the European Commission or European Parliament on the supranational side has been putting the process of integration forward and has been a vital and necessary component of the whole idea. It is thus questionable whether the demarcation of soft Euroscepticism as an attitude representing a low degree of hard Euroscepticism does not rather lead to a confusion of terms with a resulting lack of clarity in their use.

3 The Necessity of Redefining Euroscepticism

At the very least, a look at the character, definition and practical picture of the concept of soft Euroscepticism indicates its problematic nature. Is it really possible, with regard to the positions of parties being studied in terms of European integration, to place Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) in the same category as Mečiar's Movement for democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in Slovakia (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 14)? Blame need not be confined to the fact that the author or authors lack a thorough knowledge of the cultural particulars of the given region. The problem is that the concept of soft Euroscepticism is both too vague and too limited at the same time. It is vague thanks to the reality that its definition makes it possible to include in one category a range of unrelated phenomena. It is limited in the sense of its ties to the term Euroscepticism. It is appropriate to opine that Euroscepticism should encompass, above all, a clear demarcation of parties with regard to the project of European integration, in the sense of transfer of political power and sovereignty from the national state to supranational structures. This process may be observed within European integration as a long-term trend, which, in spite of some convolutions, determines its form. At the same time, it is necessary to define or clearly determine whether we should consider the starting point for an evaluation of European integration to be a process which consists of substantial competence by supranational structures in the framework of the intergovernmental paradigm, or whether the phenomenon of Euroscepticism is to be considered a form of opposition toward the current manifestly supranational direction of the integration process.

To a certain extent, the answer to this question is key one. While, e.g., ‘single-issue’ formations — but also, for instance, both classic Swedish hard eurosceptic parties (the Green Party and the Left Party) — fulfil even the strict definition of Euroscepticism, the ODS and a range of other soft Eurosceptic parties do not at all. Of course, if we accept identification of the party with the current character of integration as a gauge of Euroscepticism or Eurooptimism then the count of Eurosceptical parties will grow. It's obvious that Euroscepticism thus defined slides into
nothingness because it has nothing to say. Another consequence of accepting the contemporary development of the EU as the only possible starting point for political analysis lies in the fact that the same logic would force us to label proponents of the supranational direction in integration in the 1970s as Euroskeptics when, at that time, development was rather in the direction of intergovernmentalism. Although one could view this approach as twisting the truth, to a certain degree it points to the fact that if Euroscepticism is to be a term capable of being systematically worked with, its definition should not be tied to contemporary political tendencies but should rather be grounded in the long-term situation.

Outlining varying motivations, characters and meanings for hard and soft Euroscepticism meantime is no reason for dividing these two categories solely on a linguistic basis. In any case, it is open to dispute whether we may identify as a variant of Euroscepticism an entity, which particularly criticizes European integration for some set of reasons and makes use of critical rhetoric. One can refer to the allegory with environmental issues. A majority of contemporary political parties have its elements encapsulated in their program. But in spite of this they are not labeled as environmental or soft green parties.

There is also another reason for better and more correct conceptualization and use of the term Euroscepticism. Political science should reflect and explain (possibly also predict) the real world of politics. In the Euroscepticism case the contrary is the case: adding all forms of criticism of the European integration in the term Euroscepticism leads to confusion and misunderstanding. As hard Eurosceptics relate especially to the peripheral protest parties (Szezcerbiak and Taggart 2008d: 10) like Belgian Flemish Block (VB) or French Le Pen’s National Front (FN), parties and politicians prevailing labeled as soft Euroskeptics (i.e., ODS, British Conservatives) are seriously affected by this ‘bad company.’ Media and public discourse, which have created the term Euroscepticism, do not distinguish between soft and hard Euroscepticism. This can lead (and really does, i.e., in the Czech Republic) to the exclusion of every manifestation of criticism to European integration from relevant political discussion referring to its non-democratic and anti-system affiliation. This approach can be seen as dangerous also from the EU political system point of view. As Simon Hix states (2005: 2), if the political system of the EU should work, there must be a presence of continuous interaction between political outputs, new demands on the system or new decisions. One can hardly claim that the only possible feedback is the positive. Every political system, if it wants to last, must process critical feedback. Pushing away all kinds of objections towards the current EU from relevant political discussion is therefore a vital problem of the EU itself.
4 Pro European: Only for Stronger Commission and Parliament?

In a new conceptualisation of Euroscepticism it seems to be necessary to take into account positive attitudes toward European integration. The succeeding step involves taking into consideration so-called integration paradigms, which are labelled as coherent positions regarding the principal points of European integration (Fiala and Pitrová 2004: 12).

As a supranational paradigm, we may label the approach, which begins from the presumption that only supranational authority is able to fulfil the task demanded to harmonize the interests of the states. The core of the supranational paradigm is the creation of a political centre, which is independent of the individual states, and to which the integrating members give up a certain portion of their sovereignty. The autonomous supranational centre makes decisions, which are binding.

The goal of the supranational approach, which has taken various forms in the history of European integration up to the present, is the creation of a political or federal union. The supranational approach may be divided on the basis of methods intended to lead to this goal. With regard to this, it is possible to differentiate most especially between federalism and neo-functionalism. In the concrete practice of the EU, integration reflects the supranational approach to deepening and expansion. As its institutional expressions, George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett identify the Commission, European Parliament and EU legal bodies (2001: 357).

The cornerstone of the intergovernmental approach, which, to a marked extent, stands in contradiction to the supranational paradigm, is the presumed inviolability of the sovereign position of the national states and their governments. Under this conception, the national state is not taken as an outmoded and dysfunctional unit incapable of looking after the needs of its citizens. The key element is the established international/political relationships between individual nations and their security ties.

From a European integration standpoint, Intergovernmentalism thus does not strive to create a political union. According to Petr Fiala a Markéta Pitrová, it may be characterized as a path toward achieving a lower level of unification (2003:17). The intergovernmental paradigm in their estimation thus presumes the creation of institutionalised cooperation between sovereign entities built on cooperation between individual states. For Intergovernmentalism, there is therefore no need for the existence of a special power centre outside the state, because this model is realized by means of an international organization or international contract.

In actual practice, the intergovernmental approach is emphasized in cooperation in the field of justice and internal matters, a common foreign and security policy, and in the use of unanimity in voting by the EU Council. The European Com-
Community was of a rather intergovernmental character, particularly in the 1960s, when the dominant institution in the Community was the Council of Ministers, which George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett label an institutional expression of intergovernmentalism (2001: 357).

It is obvious, that the theory of European integration is much more complicated and deserves much more space than it is possible to devote in this article. One may, e.g., point to integration process theory, which attempts to set out and explain the evolution of the EU, in which a host of authors is deeply involved. Mark Pollack (2001) correctly points out, the original debate between neofunctionalism (supranationalism) and intergovernmentalism has shifted into more precise and structured debate, but one can argue, that this debate concerns only scholars. For the world of the politics, the discussion has still its core in the basic problems of sovereignty, delegation of political power, further deepening the integration process or its speed. In other words, we can hardly find any political party using for expression of its attitudes to the European integration terms borrowed from constructivism or inspired by the theory of new institutionalism. It is nevertheless important to ensure that European integration is not an exclusively supranational project, i.e., the supranational paradigm may not be aligned with European integration. Consequently, support for European integration cannot be identified with support for supranationalism, and any and all reservations against them taken as an expression of Euroscepticism. On the contrary, it may be said with a measure of certainty that while supranationalism represents the predominant approach to European integration, it is not an exclusive model but rather one of two paths.

As already stated, the principal problem in the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism is determining the starting point or position with regard to which Euroscepticism and its potential variants seek to demarcate themselves. What is a pro European attitude? How should political science define it? Without an answer to these questions, every attempt to define opposition is found wanting and slides into active politics. Accepting the contemporary model of the integration process as a starting point from which to define Euroscepticism is dubious for three reasons.

The first of these is the fact that the EU has, in its current form, hardly reached its finality. As Neil Walker points out (2002), there are several delimitations of this term in the context of European integration. One of them is connected to the political finality — what should the political integration of the EU look like and where lies its limits? Other dimensions of the finality problems lie in the area of European institutions and their shape or in the integration purpose (Walker 2002).

Unsolved problems of finality are connected with the fact, that EU in its current form does not represent the political ‘Good,’ i.e., as human rights and democracy do. That means that the current form and shape of Community is not an immutable and generally respected value. The ascendancy of the supranational paradigm over the
intergovernmental paradigm defines present-day European integration. This involves not a constant value but a political process. The dominance of supranationalism therefore creates neither systematicity nor the political ‘Good,’ which would become a value in and of itself and which must be considered as the only starting point when conceptualisation of a pro-European stance is being made. European integration is a process, which plays out precisely within the confines of the conflict between several approaches. Its dynamic may even be claimed to originate from this conflict, and it is open to question whether the long-term predominance of one of these basic arguments would not mean death for the entire integration process. Political science should better reflect this potential transience of the current model and approach it critically, and not as one would approach a value. As Giandomenico Majone points out in the title of one of his books, European integration has been a process of dilemmas and even in its current stage, it is doubtful that it will lead to the European federation (2005: 219–221).

Thirdly, in evaluating positions toward European integration, political science should remain open to the opposite approach, i.e., the intergovernmental approach to European integration. A quick glance at the history of European integration will demonstrate that periods may be identified during which intergovernmentalism prevailed and determined the direction of integration. Does this entitle us to regard the supranationalists and federalists of the 1960s and 1970s as the Eurosceptics of their era? Probably not — even this quick sketch suffices to illustrate that this would be an exaggeration.

The definition of pro European attitude must therefore be created or fleshed out. As a definition, which should be subjected to further criticism and elaborated in more detail, it may be proposed that pro European attitude presents an approach, which accepts the idea of political and economic cooperation between European states within the framework of the supranational organization represented by the EU. At the same time, it is obvious that there may and in fact should be discussion in the pro-European camp about the form, tempo and character of this cooperation.

The advantage of the proposed formulation is that it takes into consideration the validity of both elementary paradigms. The components of the pro-European camp are parties, which, on the one hand, tend to the supranational, and on the other, towards the intergovernmental form of European integration. Any problem posed by the current dominance of one of the two approaches plays no significant role and does not connote an evaluation of the position of a given political party on the basis of the political situation of the moment.
5 New Typology

After defining generally pro-European attitudes as ‘an approach, which accepts the idea of political and economic cooperation between European states within the framework of the supranational organization represented by the EU,’ one can proceed to the new proposed typology. If we take as our starting point the fact that European integration in its current form is not exclusive, a classification scheme becomes available which, in the context of pro-European forces (those who support the idea of European integration) describes both supranationalist supporters of integration and adherents of the intergovernmental model. Only real opponents of the idea of European integration will then be labelled as Eurosceptics, not those who prefer its intergovernmental form or slower speed.

Aside from capturing the positions of parties towards concrete expressions of European integration, the new typology takes language into account. When it comes to attracting voter support, party rhetoric is very important. The declaratory aspect of politics in the age of mass media has acquired an ever-increasing importance, but in practice may come across more as a purely manipulative tool.

The first category in the revised typology is made up of the Europeanists. Europeanists may be identified with the supranational interpretation of European integration and with its root concepts. To a substantial degree, this group is captured by Conti’s and Verzichelli’s label ‘identity Europeanism.’ Its bearers represent the principal support for European integration. This group does not see the integration process in terms of benefits and utility for the nation or the party itself; key, rather, is the goal of integration as such and its deepening and broadening. This approach sees European integration as a good thing in and of itself; the party thus inclines to the establishment of strong supranational institutions. The communicative content of the entity is relatively important indication, even if not a decisive one. Its message is the celebration of the European idea and the unequivocal preference it gives to positive information about the EU. Europeanists consider European integration to be an embodiment of the Good. This approach considers the integration process to have a clear final goal: the establishment of a political federation with European nation and European identity. Europeanists also believe that both European nation and identity can be built and reached in foreseeable time.

The second category to be proposed is that of Eurogovernmentalists. Their ideological source is, above all, the intergovernmental paradigm of the integration process. Their basic difference from the Europeanists lies in their reservations about the existing model of integration and criticism of it. Entities, which may be labelled Eurogovernmentalists, are aware of the necessity and advantages of European cooperation. On the other hand, they are aware of its limitations. Characteristic for
them is an absence of any notion of the necessity for building or identifying political entities like a European nation or European identity. But the other side of this is that it cannot be said that Eurogovernmentalists reject all forms of political integration or cooperation. For example, cooperation in the area of foreign policy is possible, predicated of course on the supposition that it not be directed by a strong, completely independent supranational centre. An important gauge of this conception is the acceptance of the idea of European integration, albeit with an emphasis on its evolutionary, gradual realization. An important indicator of Eurogovernmentalism is language, which is sober, matter-of-fact and measured with regard to the EU. From a program emphasis standpoint, neither support nor opposition to European integration is a key question for these parties. Eurogovernmentalist entities thus often look upon European integration as a political tool and not as a goal in itself. Their support for European integration thus contains no vision of a final end.

The final group consists of the Eurosceptics. As a technical term it is useful in itself, in spite of the fact that remarks may be made about its misuse, its use for ‘schmoozing’ and its vagueness, all caused by the way in which it has been employed to this point. For the goals of the proposed typology, it may be used relatively functionally. The label is applied to those who actually oppose European integration as a value. On this basis, there cannot be any qualms about the above-described typology. Its definition, in spite of the fact that it sometimes places the accent on different indicators, is consistent. The definition of Euroscepticism thus derives from the conclusion set out in the introduction to this paper that Euroscepticism may be described as an ideology which rejects the notion that the European continent should see a transfer of political power from the national state to a supranational body in the context of the EU, which would carry out the functions of the state and would possess the attributes of the state. The motivations for this critique may be varied.

Table 2: Political party types based upon attitude to European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Integration position</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeanists</td>
<td>Uniformly positive, stress on deepening and extending integration. Cornerstone is the supranational paradigm, party/actor often differentiates self from supporters of the intergovernmental paradigm. Europeanists usually see finality of the integration process in the form of European federation.</td>
<td>Celebratory. Emphasis on the successes of integration, stress on the positive impact on the nation, visionary, future-looking, idealistic, stress on inevitability. Often criticizes the national state as a unit in terms of its ability to organize the political and economic lives of its citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurogovernmentalists</strong></td>
<td>Positive (regarding intergovernmental integration) to neutral (in relation to supranational integration). Cornerstone is the intergovernmental paradigm, party/actor may thus take a stand against supranational conceptions of European integration and their visions.</td>
<td>Neutral. European integration is considered a political reality, with both good points and bad points. Praise is chiefly for the economic positives of integration. The position regarding political integration is careful to critical. With respect to further integration, party/actor supports an evolutionary tempo. A clear vision of the goal of the integration process is lacking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurosceptics</strong></td>
<td>Uniformly negative. Eurosceptics do not agree with either of the two integration paradigms. The EU is generally seen as a bad thing.</td>
<td>Critical. Risks and failures of integration are emphasized on both the economic and political level. European integration as a process is rejected. Motivation for criticism is varied. Eurosceptics are often members of parties at the edge of the political spectrum.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Looking at the proposed category of Eurogovernmentalists, one can argue that its definition is too broad and can therefore contain all or at least too many actors. One can also claim that the same problem previously commented upon soft Euroscepticism is repeated — vagueness and catch all size.

However, this objection is tricky. The new category deals with at least three clear factors — support for European integration, neutral language and absence of integration finality. As it has been stated above, there is in fact little or no difference between, e.g., Coati’s and Verzichelli’s soft Euroscepticism and functional Europeanism. Position based upon criticizing one particular EU policy (and possible reform of the integration process) is very close to the approach based upon pragmatic support for the integration. In both cases, deep commitment to supranational vision of the EU is missing. The possible large size of the Eurogovernmentalists category is logical also for another reason. There are a minimal number of hard Eurosceptic parties in current European politics as principal support for European integration has become integral part of policy programmes of mainstream parties.

What advantages, compared to the work presented in this chapter, the new typology are there? First of all, it defines the pro European stance and works with the whole continuum of possible approaches towards the EU. Secondly, a broader
The problematic of party Euroscepticism present political science with a current and pressing theme, testimony to which is the large number of theoretical texts and case studies published to this point. This article has attempted to summarize and critically revise this research, with a clear emphasis on theoretical studies. Identification of some of the chief problems has then served as a springboard for a new conceptualisation of Euroscepticism. The result of this section of the paper has been the creation of three types of positions by political parties vis-à-vis European integration. The first type consists of the Europeanists, containing the clear supporters of the current model of the EU. The second type is the category of Eurogovernmentalists. These consist of political parties which are not opposed to the idea of European integration but have reservations about its supranational character and fast tempo. Real opponents of the EU, who agree with neither the supranational nor intergovernmental approaches to the EU, fall under the Eurosceptic type.

The proposed typology is built upon an assumption that the current stage and form of the European integration is only current stage and form, which should not be identified with support for the European integration. This approach has two advantages: a wider choice of individual categories, working with a richer understanding of European integration and incorporating the positive attitude to the European integration process. From the broader perspective, this new typology avoids poisoning the critical discussion on the European integration with phrases about nationalism, xenophobia or non-democracy. All these terms are associated with hard Eurosceptical parties (in scholarly discussion) and in media discourse with Euroscepticism. As already stated, the mass media does not distinguish between soft and hard Euroscepticism but mixes all kinds of EU critique together with all consequences for common understanding of EU critique.

This article has only theoretical ambitions and tries to offer a solution for a problem that has been bothering political science for more than 10 years. It is obvious that the typology offered within previous pages represents at this phase primarily a proposal designed to motivate further analysis and elaboration. Suitable material could be presented by an analysis of party programs (or those portions of them
devoted to European issues), along with the analysis of voting patterns of legislators from the individual political parties in the European Parliament.

Notes

1. This article has been written under the framework of fulfilling the research goal Political Parties and Representation of Interests in Contemporary European Democracies (MSM0021622407). The author is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Masaryk University, e-mail: kaniok@fss.muni.cz. Some portions of previous version of this text were presented at the international conference Euroscepticism and European Integration, which took place April 12–13, 2007 in Zagreb. An article on similar topic was published by author in Czech language in Czech Journal of Political Research (2008).

2. Kopecký and Mudde, e.g., list the Polish Popular Party (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 302).

3. Aside from the British UKIP, one example would be the Swedish Green Party, which is fighting for the exit of Sweden from the EU with the help of a new membership referendum.

4. Taggart and Szcerbiak have also criticized the europragmatic category.

5. L. Kopeček, while admitting the possible future existence of europragmatic parties, lobbies for leaving out this category as a theoretical ideal.

6. Euroscepticism itself was likely not very interesting for Conti and Verzichelli. His typology aspires to create a continual cline of positions by parties and to then relate these to the ideological orientation of the party and its membership/absence in the governing coalition. At this point also, Conti’s and Verzichelli’s often used typology is weak. This is because Conti and Verzichelli doesn’t know what to do about ‘single-issue’ Eurosceptics who do not take part in the domestic political scene. Conti’s explanation for the acceptance of eurosceptical or eurooptimist positions by means of ideology thus does not explain the functioning of Danish sceptical parties June Movement (JB) and People Against the EU (FB), nor the Swedish June Movement (J).

7. Especially interesting is Riishøj’s Atlantic Euroscepticism type, which highlights an often-overlooked motivation for Euroscepticism, the international/political dimension of party programs.

8. There is, e.g., the question as to what extent a clear division between hard and soft Euroscepticism would lead to increased interest in the fact that, e.g., in the 2004 elections to the EP hard eurosceptic parties recorded substantial growth in support. Their parliament faction has numbered just under 40 seats, meaning they have long since become more than just a curiosity.

9. As this article is written in the March 2009, one can point to the ongoing economical crises in the EU and its political impacts. Several politicians (e.g. French president Nicolas Sarkozy) have in the first months of 2009 expressed protectionist statements, requiring more power for member states and their economies in combating the recession. Should these politicians, attacking the fundamental values of the European integration, be labeled as a Eurosceptics?

10. One can refer to the Czech president Václav Klaus, who is traditionally labeled as ‘a vehement Eurosceptic’ (BBC 2008) both by the Czech and foreign mass media. Johana Grohová (2009) has called Václav Klaus as ‘a blind guru of Euroscepticism,’ the same rhetoric is used by e.g. prominent commentator Jiří Pehe. What is interesting
is that fact that no such author polemists with Klaus’s ideas or opinions, the analyses starts and ends in the term Eurosceptic.

11 See, for example, the work of Andrew Moravcsik (1998), Ben Rosamond (2000) or Mark A. Pollack (2001).

12 As a political manifestation of Europeanism can be seen speech by Joschka Fischer (2000) (former foreign minister of Germany) at the Humboldt University ‘From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European integration’ held on 12th May 2000.

13 One can refer to the last European elections held in June 2009. Hard Eurosceptics across Europe have obtained only 18 MEPs and could not have formed own group concurring on the IND/DEM group from period 2004–2009.

References


