

Development of Democracy in Post Communist States: Ideas of Justice in the Ukraine and Russia

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Abstract: *During sociological research in Russia (N = 1612) and the Ukraine (N = 1003) the question arose: ‘How do you understand the notion of “justice”?’ In both countries the characteristic of a traditional societal system of norms and values prevails. Russians more often than Ukrainians define justice as a category of law. This is the evidence of the different models of political culture development in both countries (under the influence of the dominating ideology) – aligned with the state in Russia and with society in the Ukraine. The ideology of national revival and rehabilitation of historical justice peculiar to the Ukraine opposes the ideology of sovereign democracy in Russia.*

The analysis verifies the assumption that the Ukraine is heterogeneous regarding normative and value preferences of its population and that the Ukrainians’ representations of justice reflect their evaluation of the authorities and the dominating ideology.

Keywords: *Justice, Society, Democracy, Values, Russia, the Ukraine.*

Introduction

Justice is equally both an ethical and legal category. It is a regulatory ideal of social relations and is a principle of the legitimisation of the law and the state, and, as a consequence, is an indispensable element of political ideology. Thus, the ideas of justice dominating in the society reflect the ruling system of moral values and principles the political development of the society is based upon.

The particular role of the ideas of justice that determine an individual's social and political activity has only become possible in a modern society. For Plato (*The Republic*, IV, 434e–435c), as well as for Aristotle (*Politics*, Book A), distinguishing between justice in the state and within a particular person is not quite the same as distinguishing between justice as a characteristic of the institutions and that of a characteristic of a person. For instance, according to Plato, a just person is in no way different from a just state – the same as the three conditions that determine the just state, the elements of wisdom, courage and moderation, are found in the human soul.

Only in the Modern Age where there are differentiated spheres of law, economics, and ethics, do the issues of justice receive their 'specification' in different spheres (ethics, politics, social and economical relations and law). Actually, it is only in a modern society that justice turns into a social virtue and at the same time, as the political sphere appears, – into a political value. The social contract theory (primarily by T. Hobbes) was the first attempt to overcome natural injustice by means of a just organization of society, based upon the principles of reason. The social contract theory deprived justice of the ontological status it had with the scholastics, i.e., justice as God's attribute. Justice changed into a regulative idea that determines the system of social relations and the political system in a modern society. In other words, in the Modern Age the oppression of religion was replaced with that of justice, as Charles-Louis Montesquieu had successfully pointed out in his time.

Thus, the formation of the normative core of a modern democracy, in this case, no doubt, a liberal democracy, became possible following the modern separation between the state and the society, after the autonomous spheres of politics, law and morality appeared and, as a consequence, the forming of a non-ontological concept of justice, that presumes the priority of the universal rights of an individual over any types of culturally and historically conditioned ideas. It is no coincidence that in the 20th century J. Rawls, developing the liberal tradition, builds up his theory of justice as a neutral one in regard to particular cultural norms. In this way modern day liberalism is searching for a solution to the issue raised by Aristotle, that of individuals' drawing up a *practical agreement* regarding the idea of justice, which is an indispensable ground for a political community.

After the communist regimes collapsed, the majority of the Newly Independent States, both Russia and the Ukraine are not exceptions to the rule, have chosen the strengthening of liberal democracy and a market economy as their priorities. However, it turned out that the fast fall of the old system of institutions has not necessarily resulted in the reorientation of the public consciousness to the norms and values of democracy, the accepting of which is declared on different levels of government. Moreover, *there appeared a conflict between the regulatory demands of the system of values dominating in the society and the demands put forward by the democratic experts*. The study of everyday ideas of justice offers a chance to see the peculiarity

of the transformation processes in Russia and the Ukraine, for these ideas reflect the population's expectations and value orientations.

Comparing Russia and the Ukraine is a difficult task. On one hand, Russian and Ukrainian societies have a common past of many centuries, which is reflected in numerous peculiarities typical, to a certain extent, for both societies. Both Russia and the Ukraine are post communist states, which means they are experiencing a difficult process of social, political, cultural and ideological transformation, the crisis of the value and norm sphere and the search for a new basis of social integration are typical of them, just as for other countries that used to belong to the socialist camp. Similar to the majority of post communist countries, in the Ukraine and Russia democratic choice was declared and the work on developing of democratic institutions began.

However, these institutions did not receive the value legitimization – mass consciousness, declaratively supporting the market economy, political democracy and legal state, maintaining the paternalism stereotypes in full amount, dependence of the state psychology and helplessness before its self-will (Golovakha and Panina 2006: 37). It has been significant that in the times of the USSR the intellectual tradition of liberal and social-democratic thought, developing on the territory of the Russian Empire in the end of 21st and the beginning of 20th century by B. Chicherin, B. Kistiakovsky, P. Struve, P. Novgorodcev was interrupted. The national movements, which have considerably influenced the social-political development of the newly-created post-Soviet states, were primarily based on conservative ideology.

The monitoring for many years of the social changes in the Ukraine, performed by the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Science of the Ukraine, the works of E. Golovakha, N. Panina (Golovakha and Panina 2006), as well as the research on Russian societal transformation, performed by the Analytical Centre of Yuriy Levada (Levada 2000), E. Ryvkina's research (Ryvkin 2005) testify to the lack of readiness of the Ukrainian and Russian citizens to support the institutions of a liberal society. The Survey of 'Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan: Mass Consciousness Similarities and Differences, as a Factor of Integration/Disintegration' (Zadorin and Petuhov 2005), that was held in 2004–2005, analysing the value directives of mass consciousness of the above countries, is also of great interest, in this sense. The survey draws a conclusion, important to us, that the common tendency for the post-Soviet states is the union of opposing value orientations (egalitarianism and paternalism on the one hand and liberal-democratic values on the other.) In other words, together with the 'pro-western' individualist values, competition, and personal initiative, the specific traits of the 'Soviet-style' mass consciousness are widely spread.

Taking into account the special meaning of the justice concept for power legitimisation, the authors chose the everyday notion of justice as the subject of their research. Although the idea of justice is instinctively understandable for everyday thinking, an attempt to reveal its content quite often runs into serious difficulties.

This is proven by the research conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) in Russia in 2000 (n = 1500) – one third of the respondents refused to answer the question: ‘What is justice?’ This is the only study in which the aim was to clarify the everyday idea of what justice actually is¹.

Methods of Study

The respondents in Russia and the Ukraine were offered an open question to answer: ‘How do you understand the word *justice*; what does it mean?’

The answers to this open question did not give the opportunity to determine the type of justice dominating the society, for it was often that the answers could not have been interpreted as the respondents’ understanding of justice as, let us say, distributive, retributive, commutative etc. In most cases it was more or less possible to determine only the sphere – morality, politics, law, ethics, and economy – that the respondents would refer justice to. At same time, the division of the answers into the ‘spheres of justice’ (M. Walzer²), such as ethical, legal, political, social and economical categories, is theoretically interesting, for it not only offers a possibility to determine how justice is understood, but also allows one to determine the orientation dominant in the society – the orientation towards morality, law, political and economical relations.

The results of studies conducted by other scientists as well as the social and philosophical analysis of the modern Ukrainian and Russian societies have allowed putting forward two hypotheses: (1) There are no significant differences in the perception of justice by the citizens of Russia or the Ukraine and (2) the interpretation of justice as an ethical category dominates the society³.

Based on the concept of M. Walzer, while analysing, the authors did not limit themselves to grouping the answers, as FOM had done, but referred the groups obtained to different ‘spheres of justice.’ In the course of the analysis, it became evident that not all the answers could be definitely referred to a single sphere – ethical, political, legal, or social and economic. Some of them clearly had moral and ethical, or moral and legal senses of justice intermingled. Some responses, because of their ambiguous meaning, could not be referred to a particular sphere – as a result, they were put together to form separate groups. The interpretations of the grouped responses given below must be considered as hypothetical – they do nothing but create a basis for further qualitative studies.

Results of studies

During the spring of 2006, ROMIR Monitoring conducted a survey in Russia (n = 1612, representativeness error $\Delta = 2.5\%$), and so did Kiev International Sociology Institute (KISI) in the Ukraine (n = 1003, representativeness error $\Delta = 3.2\%$).

Four fifths of all the participants agreed to explain what justice was. 19.9 % of the Ukrainian participants and 21.2 % of Russian found it difficult to answer or would give an answer off the topic (Table 1).

In both Russia (35.4 %) and the Ukraine (38.8 %), justice is largely explained as an ethical category. Thus, the hypothesis of the dominating role of ethics in the ideas of justice has been proved. However, the hypothesis that the Russians and Ukrainians do not have significant differences in their ideas of justice has not. On the contrary, there was quite an unexpected difference in the value orientations of the public consciousness in Russia and the Ukraine.

Table 1: Comparative Assessment of Justice by the Respondents in Russia and the Ukraine

Groups	Frequency distribution, %	
	Ukraine	Russia
1. Justice as an ethic category	38.8	35.4
1.1. Justice as personal quality and characteristic of acts	21.8	18.7
1.2. Justice as a characteristic of interpersonal attitudes	8.0*	3.5*
1.3. Everything done the fair way	4.8	4.2
1.4. Truth, genuine	2.5*	4.3*
1.5. Normative justness	0.9*	4.0*
1.6. Religious ideas of justice	0.7	0.5
2. Justice as a law category	8.6*	15.4*
2.1. Equal rights, observance of human rights and freedoms	1.6*	3.9*
2.2. Law observance	6.6	8.2
2.3. Punishment of unlawful acts	0.4*	3.3*
3. Non-differentiated ethic and law perception of justice	5.2*	1.3*
4. Justice as a social and economic category	6.2	6.6
4.1. Equal distribution of common goods	2.6	2.4
4.2. Justice reward of labour, welfare	3.3	3.6
4.3. Equal opportunities	0.3	0.7
5. Non-differentiated perception of justice as a social/economic and ethic category	5.3	4.9
5.1. Justice as a social and ethic category	1.8	0
5.2. You get what you deserve"	3.5	4.9
6. Justice as a political category	5.3	6.4
6.1. State social protection	2.5	3.8
6.2. Authorities' honesty	2.8	1.2
6.3. Leader as a guarantee of justice	0	0.3
6.4. Law and order	0	1.1

7.	Justice as equality	4.4	4.1
7.1.	Equal treatment of all	2.1	2.4
7.2.	Equality in everything	2.3	1.8
8.	There is no justice	6.4	4.6
9.	No idea / answer off the topic	19.9	21.2
	Total:	100 %	100 %

Source: Authors

* Differences are significant at a 0.05 level.

Note: Russia N = 1612, Ukraine N = 1003.

Regarding justice as an ethical category, the most frequent responses (21.8 % of the respondents in the Ukraine and 18.7 % in Russia) are those describing justice as *a personal quality or a characteristic of an individual act*: ‘Honesty, decency, sense of responsibility’, ‘honest treatment of the people around you, conscience’.

In the Ukrainian sample, the second largest group of responses bearing the heading ‘ethical category’ and is *justice as a characteristic of interpersonal relationships*: ‘This is when people respect each other and base their living on truth.’ Justice is being explained as a norm of interpersonal relations, with a special emphasis placed on mutuality, trust, mutual respect and consent. Such responses were fewer among Russians (8.0% in the Ukraine against 3.5 % in Russia).

‘*The fair way*’ responses (4.9 % in the Ukraine and 4.2 % in Russia) are hard to interpret without additional studies. The respondents could mean a wide variety of things, ranging from the individual behaviour norm all the way to the demand for social justice and the wish for fair government.

Some respondents, mainly Russians (4.0 % versus 0.9 % of the respondents from the Ukraine), have determined justice as *a normative justness*: ‘Observance of the rules of the way of living.’ 0.7 % of the Ukrainian respondents and 0.5% of the Russian revealed a *religious understanding of justice*: ‘This is God, God’s word sole and just.’

There are answers in which justice is regarded as *truth, verity*, meaning both the absence of a lie and the ontological Truth (2.5 % in the Ukrainian sample and 4.3% – in the Russian).

Only 8.6 % of the Ukrainian respondents against 15.4 % of the Russian determined justice as a legal category. 1.6 % of the respondents in the Ukraine and 3.9 % in Russia have determined justice as *equality of rights, observance of human rights and freedoms*: ‘To have equal rights with the rest, and in a wider sense – securing them, as well,’ ‘observance of citizens’ rights and freedoms.’ For the Ukrainians (6.6 %) and the Russians (8.2 %), *the observance of the law* by all the members of the society (‘to observe the letter of the law independent of the social status,’ ‘to live in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation’) have turned out to be more important than the rights themselves.

It is interesting that the citizens of Russia (3.3 %) attach significantly more importance to *punishment* than the Ukrainians (0.4 %), accentuating the equality regarding observance of the laws: ‘Equal punishment for all, independent of the status,’ ‘if

you break a law, punishment is imminent.’ In the Ukrainian sample, prevailing in this group ‘*Criminals – to jails*’ is one of the most effective *orange* slogans.

It is worth adding that such a result was only possible to obtain because of the authors’ referring to a separate group of the answers in which the law and ethic conceptions of justice are merged (5.0 % in the Ukraine against 1.3 % in Russia): ‘when all the people are equal before the law, they are guided by moral values.’ These responses clearly show the assumption that only an honest person will be willing to obey the laws, and hence obeying the law and honesty turn into the norm of individual behaviour. That is why these responses present justice as an ethical category.

Despite some well-established myths, all this proves a lower level of development of legal consciousness in the Ukraine, for the Ukrainian people, to a great extent, tend to confuse ethical and legal norms. There have not been any significant differences detected between the citizens of Russia and the Ukraine concerning distributive justice.

Justice as a social and economic category (6.2 % in the Ukraine and 6.6 % in Russia) covers the responses concerning the level of income, the standard of living and basic opportunities. Surprisingly, the demand for *equal distribution of public benefits* (‘everyone receives the equal share,’ ‘it is when all live similarly’) would appear in the answers more rarely than expected – with only 2.6 % of the Ukrainian respondents and 2.4 % of the Russians.

3.3 % of the Russians and 3.6 % of the Ukrainians have determined justice to be a *fair salary*, placing the accent not on the equality of the incomes, but on the quality of life: ‘good salary and pension, every person deserves a decent living’. The same is applied to the responses that determine justice as equal *opportunity*.

Interesting to mention is that, in the Ukrainian sample, there is a group of answers (1.8 %), in which justice is represented as a ***social and ethical category***: ‘truth, welfare,’ ‘honesty, a right to a good pension’. The ‘reward based on merit’ responses (4.9 % in Russia and 3.5 % in the Ukraine) also contain ethical and social/economic concealed meaning. It is possible to say that for the respondents having answered this way social justice is a moral value. Additionally, this social justice does not mean universal equality or equal distribution, but the fact that personal efforts, including labour, as well as moral qualities and actions must be remunerated in the form of social success: ‘Let him/her get what he/she deserves’.

Social justice is also dwelled upon in the group of responses interpreting justice as a widening of basic opportunities for the population, and as social protection (2.5 % in the Ukrainian sample and 3.8 % in the Russian). However, unlike the ‘Fair salary, welfare’ group, these responses clearly state that it is the government’s or the state’s duty to secure its citizens’ high standard of living, thus these answers have been referred to the political sphere. In other words, these responses are concerned with *State social protection*: ‘This is when a state cares for its citizens.’ There is even

a saying that justice is the Soviet Union. It is worth paying attention to the fact that the majority of the responses of this group deal not with the protection of the unprotected layers of the population, but with the fact that it is the State's duty to secure its citizens' level of well being.

Referring to *justice*, 2.8 % of the respondents in the Ukraine and 1.2 % of those in Russia meant the *government's honesty*: 'Truthfulness, honesty of the officials,' 'an honest and non-corrupted state.' Just as in the previous group of the answers, justice here is a political category.

It is in the answers concerning the role of the state that the Russian and Ukrainian samples differ the most in their content. The Ukrainians primarily stress corruption, and the dishonest government accused of banditry. The Russians, instead, refer to '*law and order*' (1.1 %), and to *a strong leader as a guarantee of justice* (0.3 %): 'strong leader', 'justice is Putin'. The Ukrainians *gave no answer of this kind at all*.

The '*equality in everything*' responses have been placed into a separate group (2.3 % in the Ukraine and 1.8 % in Russia), so have the *equal treatment of all* (2.1 % in the Ukraine and 2.4 % in Russia). It is hard to point out that what is meant whether it is the equal access to social benefits or everyone's equally obeying the law or equal opportunities, etc. Generally, there are certain reasons to presume that 'equality in all' has to deal not only with distributive justice (dividing everything into equal shares), but *is* a demand for social homogeneity of the Soviet style.

The data received in the course of the studies on justice have elements in common with the respondent's answers to the question on how they understand **political stability**⁴. The respondents in Russia and the Ukraine were asked: 'Which expression reflects best your understanding of the political stability in the Russian (Ukrainian) society?'⁵.

Table 2: Comparison of the Results from Russia and the Ukraine with the Statistical importance of the Difference Considered

Variants of answers:	Russia	Ukraine	Deviation
Stability is the presence of a strong leader fighting corruption, oligarchs, crime, and injustice.	20.70 %	27.06 %	6.36 %*
Stability is no revolutions, no civil wars or conflicts	12.98 %	12.44 %	-0.54 %
Stability is independence from other states	6.49 %	4.05 %	-2.44 %
Stability is peace, no threats from other countries, no acts of terrorism	23.84 %	14.52 %	-9.32 %*
Stability is a consent, cooperation of all the citizens in order to reach a common goal	11.07 %	14.74 %	3.67 %
Stability is a guarantee of civil freedoms and rights, equal obedience of the law	17.27 %	18.52 %	1.25 %
Stability is stagnation, no changes in the state	5.52 %	1.79 %	-3.73 %
Hard to answer	2.13 %	6.89 %	4.76 %
Total:	100.00 %	100.00 %	0.00 %

Source: Authors

* Differences are significant at a 0.05 level.

A majority of the Russians link political stability with the absence of external threats to the state, and only then do they link it to a strong leader who, we may draw the conclusion, is a guarantor of the stability of the state. The citizens of the Ukraine, on the contrary, link political stability with a strong leader to a greater extent than the Russians do; the Ukrainians, who are oriented towards the cooperation between people, are more inclined to perceive stability positively⁶, but the concept of the state and the external threats linked to the concept, play a secondary role among the Ukrainians.

Regarding this, there raises an issue of the Ukrainian citizens' view of the just state. In July 2007, 1,600 Ukrainians (n = 1600, representativeness error $\Delta = 2.5\%$) were offered to respond to the question, from the most important to the least important: 'A just state is a state in which...'

Table 3: The Ukrainian citizens' view of the just state

NN Possible answers *	1 place, %	2 place, %	3 place, %	4 place, %
1. All the citizens are guaranteed protection by the state (access to medicine, education, high labour reward)	42.8	28.6	18.3	10.4
2. Citizens' rights and freedoms are secured, law is above all	35.6	32.5	20.5	11.5
3. The authorities care for the preservation of national traditions, order, moral	10.1	20.0	32.3	37.6
4. The citizens participate in making important state decisions and control the work of the authorities	10.5	18.0	28.8	42.7

Source: Authors

*The order of the answers in the questionnaire was different.

As seen from the table, for the majority of the Ukrainians, a just state is a state in which there is a secured social justice, first of all. For the people, the protection granted by the state turns out to be by far more significant than securing their political rights, i.e., the rights to the immediate participation in making of the most important state decisions.

What attracts attention is the negative association of the high level of the significance ($p < 0,001$) between the variables 'Citizens' rights and freedoms are secured, law is above all' and 'The citizens participate in making important state decisions and control the work of the authorities.' This means that the largest amount of the responsibility for the securing of human rights and freedoms, as well as the observance of the law is placed within the state. In other words, the population does not link the just state to civil activity.

The presented data is a warning signal. It shows the readiness of the majority of the Ukrainian citizens to sacrifice their political rights, trading them for social

protection (and there is a chance merely for such a promise), which rises doubt as to a swift consolidation of democratic values in the Ukrainian society.

Conclusions

Over a long period of time, there was a popular opinion that the development of the countries freed from the communist ideology dictate would inevitably head towards the consolidation of democratic values and the institutionalisation of democratic procedures. However, the transformations that have taken place in the post communist states over the last fifteen years serve witness to the fact that the situation is not that simple. In several cases, many of these countries may be marked as 'illiberal democracies', for there exist the democratic procedures for forming the regime, but at the same time the basic democratic principles, e.g., individual citizen's political and cultural rights, are violated. 'Absent republic' – the words D. Barbu used to describe the present day Romania, thus stressing the existence of democratic procedures and the absence of the public sphere (*die Öffentlichkeit*), in which the citizens would act as autonomous public actors (See: Baga 2004: 27).

Why cannot liberalism, i.e., the liberal ideal of justice in this case, which claims the role of a simple procedure brought up on the base of neutral principles, manage to become firmly established in many post communist societies (including Russian and Ukrainian)? The liberal values have been pronounced to be the basic ones for these societies, and democratic institutes have become the elements of the new political system. At the same time, the ideas of justice dominating in everyday life are largely of a traditional nature, and publicity as a procedure of the agreeing of the rival ideas is not torn apart. Thus, this very liberalism is not that value is as neutral, as its followers may affirm. It will inevitably be rejected, if the values dominating in the society do not correspond to the principle of individual rights and that of procedural justice, the theory of justice by J. Rawls being an example. That seems to be the main reason that democratic institutions have not received legitimisation in the modern Russian and Ukrainian societies.

According to the research conducted, the responses given by the citizens of Russia and the Ukraine do not significantly differ. The research has proven that the dominating idea of justice, both in Russia and Ukraine is justice as an ethical category. The Ukrainians interpret justice as a characteristic of interpersonal attitudes, while the Russians largely stress the truthfulness and normative accuracy. It all serves as evidence to the fact that the two societies are dominated by the value/normative system typical for the traditional society with *die Gemeinschaft* social type. However, a considerably larger number of the Russians link justice to the securing of human rights and freedoms, and to demanding punishment for illegal acts. Moreover, the Ukrainians are inclined to confuse moral and legal norms. This all strengthens the

conclusion that in Russia, legal consciousness is more developed, while the Ukrainians are largely guided by the norms of traditional morality. The situation is reflected in the peculiarities of the political cultures and the political regimes of the two countries.

The ideology of 'a sovereign democracy' being developed by the current Russian authorities is oriented to the search for a proper and unique way that would be based upon the peculiarities of the historical and cultural development of Russia and not on blind copying of the European cultural and political models. Although this ideology targets the national and cultural renaissance, the notion of *nation* is not limited to a particular ethnic group, but is, first of all, explained as a political unity, placing accent onto the multi-national nature of Russia. With this in mind, there is a pattern of a strong state as a guarantor of the political and social/economical development being stressed – a state which is separated from business and is *dominating* over it, for only this way the state is capable of protecting the *national* interests, and not those of big business. It is interesting that the ideology of 'a sovereign democracy' accentuates the independence of the tack of the Russian state, revealing Russia's striving for self-assertion as a totally independent player on the political scene⁷.

Justice, interpreted as acquiring the material well-being and freedom within the limits of legality (for all the people and social groups making up the Russian nation), is one of those basic values that the idea of 'sovereign democracy' refers to. The ideological directives mentioned considerably interconnect with the mass attitudes of the Russians. The situation in Ukraine is somewhat different.


The conservative ideology currently dominating in Ukrainian political discourse, an adherent of which is the President of Ukraine, also refers to the past, appealing for a cultural and national renaissance. However, it appeals only to one ethnic group, its traditions, culture and language. In such a case, the self-assertion of Ukrainian statehood is being formed through the Ukraine's contrasting itself with Russia, with a construction of a negative image of an authoritarian Russia as an *alien* (Neumann 2004) being opposed by a positive image of a democratic Ukraine. Special attention is given to the assessment of the imperial period of the shared past of the two nations. It is not by chance that one of the dominating ideological concepts in today's Ukraine is '*historical justice*' (in some interpretations 'historical justice' coincides with '*national justice*'), for the very Ukrainian history in the national-democratic discourse (the reference for the present day stage of the Ukrainian statehood) is regarded to as a continuous injustice towards the entire Ukrainian nation through the strangling of its national development, which resulted in the nations' disability to create its own state. Though, the idea of Ukrainian statehood still remains subordinate to the idea of the national and cultural renaissance. All in all, the nationalistic discourse, that dominates the political scene of the Ukraine at the moment, is the logical continuation of the 'orange revolution,' which declaring itself as democratic by value-nor-

mative foundations, appeared to be a cultural-ethnic based revolution. (Golovakha, Panina 2005).

The ideologies of national renaissance and those of the restoration of historical justice, typical for the Ukraine, are being opposed by Russia's ideology of state. This explains a large number of responses in the Russian questionnaires (unlike in the Ukrainian) of 'unbiased' notions of order, punishment, discipline, and norms typical for the legal consciousness *d'état*. However, judging from this, the Russian political project, which interprets the state as a guarantor of lawfulness, of securing human rights and liberties, and interprets a nation as a political, so to say, super-ethnic community, makes a larger contribution to the development of the civic legal consciousness. At the same time, the Ukrainian version of the national statehood is mainly based not upon the law, but rather on the moral values of the traditional society.

However, the situation gets worse as almost one half of Ukrainians do not support the project of the national renaissance as an ethnic-cultural one. The data that we received (Graph 1) declare that, there are regional differences of the value utilities of the mass consciousness in the Ukraine. The eastern Ukrainian citizens comprehend justice as a social-economic category, and at the same time there can be observed the least number of responses, where justice is being interpreted as an ethical category. The eastern Ukrainian population also understands justice as social protection and the truthfulness of the authorities. The whole meaning of it is almost opposite in Central and Western Ukraine: the citizens of these regions are not likely to interpret the meaning of justice in the terms of social justice.

Graph 1: Responses Distribution by Regions of the Ukraine ($p < 0.001$)



Source: Authors

Despite this, the results gathered since 1994 till 2006 by the Kiev International institution testify that toleration towards the political freedoms and equality under the law for the members of society *on both sides of the Ukraine is almost the same* (Khmelko 2006). In other ways, the liberal-democratic values have about the same meaning for citizens of Eastern and Western Ukraine. At the same time both Central and Western Ukraine use the traditionalistic values of social relationships regulation.

Thus, the ethnic-cultural project of the renaissance in the Ukraine is mostly supported by the central and western regions. South-eastern regions are mainly Russia-oriented and do not support the conservative ideology, though they themselves still do not have a significant ideological project of their own, which could have built a value-normative basis for the consolidation of all the Ukrainian community, but not just for its separate parts.

Notes

- ¹ There are quite a few investigations performed by Russian scientists, uncovering different aspects of the theory of justice and everyday notions of justice in Russia. These are, for example, the social justice investigation by M.Nazarov (Nazarov 1999), legal justice – O. Gulevich and E. Golynchik (Gulevich, Golynchik 2005), as well as the social justice notion research by R. Ryvkina (Ryvkin 2005). In these investigations the notion of justice is being examined together with other notions as a factor of the value-normative directives of everyday consciousness, or being researched, which position justice occupies among other values. However, they all fail to uncover how justice is being understood.
- ² M. Walzer, following the theory of L. Wittgenstein on 'language games' develops a contextual approach of justice. He shows: 'Justice is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life. To override those understandings is (always) to act unjustly' (Walzer 1983: 314). Walzer distinguishes several spheres of justice (in correspondence to a number of the forms of social practices and the social benefits linked to them – economic sphere, political sphere, sphere of well-being, etc.) that are not subordinate to one another and exist independently one from the other, considering its content explanation and its functional content. The spheres of justice are not being reduced by one another because each has its own unique criteria, for they correspond to the different social benefits. Injustice, accordingly, appears when the criteria of one sphere starts being used in the other. (The Critical Analysis of the 'Complex Equality' Theory by M. Walzer, also his notion of 'sphere of justice', see: (Miller D., Walzer M. 1995), special attention to p.67–81, 99–120). Our work has proved that in their everyday notions people reflect certain social practices (spheres of ethics, law, politics, economy).
- ³ According to the FOM 38 % of the respondents define justice as a moral norm.
- ⁴ The studies on the everyday ideas of political stability were conducted simultaneously with those on the ideas of justice. All the parameters of the sampling in the both cases coincide.
- ⁵ L. Pautowa and the authors of this article develop the issue.

6. It is most likely that for the Ukrainians stability has turned out to be a more positive value because of the series of tense political events Ukraine has been living through since the fall of 2004. Unlike the Ukraine, Russia, after 1999, has had a certain stabilization of the political process; hence, there has been a growing tendency for changes and a perception of stability as stagnation.
7. Deputy director of the Administration of the President of Russian Federation V. Surkov has represented the main point of the 'sovereign democracy' concept in the program article 'Nationalization of the Future'. In the article he states: 'The concept of the sovereign democracy claims to be the demonstration of power and dignity of the Russian nation through the development of the civil community, reliable state, competitive economy and the effective mechanism of influencing the world events' (Surkov 2006: 29). Respectively, the goal proposed by Surkov, is 'justice for everyone in Russia and for Russia in the whole world' (Surkov 2006: 44). (Investigation of the concept of 'sovereign democracy' see: (Polyakov 2007)).

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