History in Europeanisation Studies: Lessons from Switzerland

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Abstract: The Swiss experience with Europeanisation is still often ignored, though it could be helpful in conceptualising this quite new field of study. A more open definition permitting scrutiny of the antecedents of the EU and a functional approach leaving aside questions of formal membership will contribute to a better understanding of differentiated integration, a trend that will continue. The Swiss example supports the case for the inclusion of historical aspects in Europeanisation analysis since it reminds us that Europeanisation is not merely a contemporary, Brussels-based phenomenon and that we should not neglect non-member states or the pre-membership history of current member states. Given the uncertain future of further EU-enlargement there may be more states Europeanised on a functional level without participating in the institutions – as is already the case in Switzerland.

Keywords: Switzerland – Europeanisation – History – Functionalism – Differentiated Integration

Introduction

Europeanisation did not start with the European Union. Numerous rapprochements and organisations pre-dated the Treaty of Maastricht, yet many visions of a European order dating back to 1952 or even earlier included countries that are still
not EU members and probably never will be, e.g., Turkey or Russia. In particular, the tentative involvement of one country in the early days of European integration, its reasons for rejecting formal participation in the ongoing process and its current incremental way back to the European mainstream offer insights into the hegemonic power of European unification: The example of Switzerland sheds light on the manifold paths to European integration (including differentiated integration and functional Europeanisation) and on the impact the choices made at each crossroads had and has for the countries of Europe. Switzerland today may be in the slow lane but is still effected by what happens on the European highway.

In the following defence of the inclusion of the Swiss decades-long experience in Europeanisation studies the author primarily refers to O’Leary (1987) and Featherstone (1998). In their respective studies they used ‘Europeanisation’ as a functional term to describe the process of modernisation caused by a unifying Europe. Europeanisation is equated with bringing countries (back) into the European mainstream, with assimilation (which also connects to the horizontal pattern of Europeanisation) and normalisation.

Still an Overlooked Case?

Political Science has finally extended its scope beyond the dynamics of the European institution-building process and is now analysing the impact of European integration on the political processes of the individual member states by adapting Gourevitch’s (1978) famous call to conduct more research on how the international system affects domestic politics (‘second image reversed’-approach). Nevertheless, the concentration on formal institutional aspects of member positions meant that the bigger picture was obscured when just dealing with the single member states and their adaptation to the European Union. Therefore a broader conceptualisation of Europeanisation now allows for the inclusion of non-member states (if they are at least candidate states). Nonetheless, researchers still restrict themselves to contemporary developments and changes at the national level when describing an “…incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994: 69). More exhaustive studies explicitly concerned with establishing a general research agenda for relating Europeanisation to domestic politics, policies and polities, for the most part, analyse the EU-related re-orientation of institutions and structures (Kohler-Koch 1998; Green Cowles et al. 2000). Similarly, Radaelli (2000: 27), in his promising attempt to re-define Europeanisation for political scientists overlooked the fact that Europeanisation is not merely a Brussels-based phenomenon. Recently, Lehmkuhl (2007: 349) highlighted
some outstanding questions for future research and even came out in support of a broader perspective, while at the same time stating that “Europeanisation has not – yet? – accomplished the move from conceptual issue to theory” and that theoretically richer related concepts would have analytical advantages. Buller and Gamble (2002), however, advocated a definition of Europeanisation as a living concept that evolves over time and allows for alterations – which may imply some openness to functional as well as historical approaches in the ongoing theorisation process.

In sum, although there is some discussion on the geographical limits of Europeanisation, the aspect of functional Europeanisation in a historical context has, so far, largely been ignored. But in order to understand the European project and the extent of Europeanisation when facing a future of even more differentiated integration, one has to take into account that EU-related decisions taken at the national level by member states and non-member states are also shaped by historical experiences with unifying Europe and by domestic legacies. This idea was initially propounded by Olsen (1992) and taken up again by Gstöhl (2002) who offered perceptive insights into Swiss-EU relations across five decades as did Dupont and Sciarini (2001) who outlined the historical background, while not dealing explicitly with the concept of Europeanisation. Most recently Church (2007) also took historical aspects into consideration, but only as background information rather than analysing the long tradition of Swiss functional Europeanisation, as this article seeks to do.

Kux (1998) analysed first that it is domestic institutional logic rather than formal membership, which are conducive to processes of adaptation in Switzerland and thereby challenged the importance of formal membership within Europeanisation studies with a lasting effect. If “the adjustments made at the national level […] in order to accommodate new situations” (Hanf and Soetendorp 1998: 2) were taken as the main criterion to define the process, Switzerland was at least subsumed under the term “indirect Europeanisation” (ibid: 5). Yet, pigeonholing Switzerland as only indirectly Europeanised overlooks the fact that direct Europeanisation also effects the country as a result of straightforward transmission mechanisms deriving from bilateral contracts between Switzerland and the EU, as pointed out by Fischer, Nicolet and Sciarini (2004).

Although it is largely recognised by now that Switzerland is very much subject to Europeanisation, when leaving behind the until recently prevailing mainstream definition to restrict the notion of Europeanisation to changes in the relations of the union to its member states (or even the “de jure transfer of sovereignty to the EU level” [Lawton 1999: 91]), the historical aspects of Europeanisation have thus far been ignored. But the example of Switzerland should make us think of reviving more open concepts as elaborated for instance by Olsen (1992) or Featherstone (1998), who called for the geographical and historical extension of Europeanisation.
studies already in the early years of this field of research respectively still argue for keeping definitions parsimonious (Olsen 2002). Because among the European non-EU members there are indeed many intermediate stages and patterns of integration, which proves that the concept of membership is no more a clear-cut issue than the concept of Europeanisation itself: Switzerland in particular displays an unexpectedly high level of adjustment to EU-regulations, almost approaching that of member states (Mach et al. 2003). In some aspects the country is even more “EUropean” than official members, because Switzerland has signed the Schengen/Dublin Agreement that is operative since mid-December 2008 while ‘true’ EU-member states like the UK or Ireland do not fully take part. Generally, the country has to come to terms with an evolving polity that is re-defining its political activity and already imposing constraints on the cherished and proverbial ‘Swiss liberty,’ i.e. independence, that is a significant component of Swiss identity. Bern eagerly sought to harmonise national legislation to bring it into line with the *acquis communautaire* and therefore negotiated a set of bilateral agreements, because – contrary to the idealised picture painted by EU-opponents – Switzerland was not faring so well outside the European Union. The country faced recession, rising unemployment, and a growing distrust of authority and institutions in the same way as did its neighbours (Church 1996).

When focusing on the Swiss case in this article, the author will argue in favour of not restricting the notion ‘Europeanisation’ to the structures and the timeframe of the European Union. Taking into account Harmsen’s and Wilson’s (2000: 20) remark that “Europeanisation reminds us of the need for sustaining the study of the EU as an integral part of a broader, interdisciplinary European Studies, which is as interested in the issues of culture and identity as it is in economic integration and political union,” this paper will extend the notion to the historical process of European integration and look back at the antecedents of 1992. The author intends to show that, concerning Europeanisation, Switzerland is overall less distinctive than commonly assumed. The country has a long history of affecting and being affected by the idea and later by the fact of European integration. Switzerland and the history of its evolving relationship with the project of European unification exemplify the historical and present-day relations every European country has with the EU – even if not a member. Or in Church’s words, “(L)ike it or hate it, relations with the European Union are an unavoidable issue for all European countries. Whether members or not, this is one of the key elements in their political agenda” (1996: 17). The Swiss case highlights the fact that Europeanisation neither was nor is a one-way process but a history of “upload” and “download” (Börzel 2002). Initial consideration of participation in European integration and the country’s subsequent retraction not only impacted on Switzerland but also on the EC and shaped both their structures and policies. Today it seems as if Switzerland’s adaptation is only a reaction, “adjusting to European rules without being able to share in making them” (Church 2000b:
But Switzerland’s refusal to join the union shapes some of the most important EU policies as responses to this refusal, for instance the trans-European transport networks. Consequently, the bilateral agreements of recent years do not only represent Switzerland’s interests and reflect the need to access European markets. Good relations are also vital to the interests of the EU – notwithstanding the EU’s better bargaining position (Gstöhl 2007).  

**Europeanisation: A Decades-long Experience without Membership**

The very phrase *United States of Europe* was first publicly used in 1848, and the idea of European integration leading to a federal state, with the USA or Switzerland as the role model, was seriously aired thereafter. Although sometimes not very thoroughly studied but rather idealised – as is also the case today – multilingual and bi-confessional Switzerland served as an example for people thinking about a better, peaceful Europe, like Victor Hugo in the 19th or Winston Churchill in the 20th century. Swiss politicians exploited this appreciation from outside to strengthen domestic cohesion among those who were not entirely happy with the new, increasingly centralising Swiss state. They built on a romantic sense of a mission and established a collective national sentiment, supported by the fact that Switzerland had won a reputation as “the country of liberty.” As a consequence, the role of model was gladly accepted, and constitutional proposals for European unification were drafted by Swiss scholars and politicians. After the Franco-Prussian War, Switzerland, an ideal neutral location for meetings, began to open up by hosting international conferences and providing Good Offices in European conflicts. This marked the beginning of the country’s commitment to European affairs. Herren (2000) analysed Swiss internationalism as a way for Switzerland to gain access to power via the backdoor and pointed out the Swiss strategy of ensuring domestic cohesion among linguistic and confessional groups by protecting economic interests without provoking conflict with the big players on its borders. This accounted for the Swiss government’s reluctance to play a more active part in European affairs. These first tentative international initiatives at governmental level and the proposals from prominent actors in politics and civil society – no matter how vague and unworkable they were – are the earliest evidence of the European issue’s impact in Switzerland and herald adjustments at the national level, first and foremost regarding Swiss foreign policy in the 1920s and the redefinition of neutrality towards warring nations.

As the country was situated in a region of belligerents, strict neutrality was the key to survival (Ehs 2005a). Once the League of Nations was established, however, neutrality became less important. So, in 1920 the country’s foreign policy came up
with differential neutrality as a further step towards integrating into the international system. Nevertheless, practice disproved theory: The League failed to prevent war and a return to strict neutrality was the Swiss result. Since then “neutrality has moved from being a tool of policy to a defining and untouchable virtue linked […] to national cohesion as well as to independence” (Church 2004b: 278).10 Though official Switzerland regarded the Sonderfall as the only viable way forward, the brushes with the European issue had left their mark: a sense of a Euro-mission11 and the interests of business people and intellectuals who remained committed to ongoing internationalisation or “Europeanisation.” Already in June 1934, the Europa-Union had been founded in Basle with the aim of promoting the United States of Europe by giving the idea Euro-wide organisational structures. Henceforth, the Swiss engagement in European integration was in the hands of civil society. The country became the hub for intellectuals from all over Europe and many conferences prior to the important Hague Congress of 1948 took place in Switzerland (Ehs 2009).

In spite of the fact that movements like the Europa-Union only promoted vague programmes of European unification, they had a concrete though temporary impact on the Swiss system, accounting for a new trend in civil society. Traditionally, direct democracy offers many opportunities for political involvement, but since the interwar years, more and more clubs and societies had emerged which were also active on the international stage. They developed para-party structures, which challenged the official, reluctant European policy of Switzerland. Despite such promising activities on the part of the Swiss intellectual elite, the majority of the Swiss populace could not be won over for the idea with a lasting effect. As strict neutrality and steering clear of trouble had proved successful international relations strategies there was no willingness to abandon them for a promising, but still unsettled united Europe. Moreover, the institutionalisation of Europe as started in the 1950s was not federal, not bottom-up, not direct democratic: not Swiss-style. Though contemporary pro-EU movements like the New European Movement Switzerland now draw on the structures and international relations of those inter-war and immediate post-war societies, these groupings had no lasting impact on the Europeanisation of Switzerland at the time. They could not bring about any adjustments to the West European mainstream in times when Sonderfall-thinking became dominant in Swiss foreign policy, and the years from 1920 to 1938 were seen as an abortive attempt to normalise. In fact, the Europeanisation of Switzerland went another way, a very “EUropean” way: economic integration.

Switzerland, a trade-dependent country, integrated into the Western economic system with ease although it continued to subscribe to strict neutrality. From the very beginning it participated in the European Recovery Programme (1947) and in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (1948).12 Economic integration without political participation became the feature of Swiss-European relations
in the second half of the 20th century (Tanner 1990), which can be seen as the visible expression “of a wider Swiss creed of disengagement from international political involvement” (Church 2004b: 269). Since the European Coal and Steel Community and even more so the European Economic Community were regarded as instruments of political integration and therefore incompatible with neutrality, Switzerland along with six other countries founded the European Free Trade Association as an alternative that would not, in contrast to a customs union, create problems for its three institutional cornerstones: neutrality, direct democracy and federalism. According to the Swiss Federal Council (1960), EFTA membership would not lead to foreign judges and would leave Swiss independence completely intact – an analysis applicable to formal Europeanisation via EFTA but overlooking functional, indirect Europeanisation. Despite Switzerland’s staying outside, the political momentum of the European Communities caused the country to adapt in various ways, for example the creation of the Integration Office in connection with the policy shift of the Swiss government in pursuance of an association treaty with the EC in 1961, and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 1972.

The phenomenon of functional Europeanisation was first drawn to public attention in 1971 by the Swiss Federal Council, which recognised that Switzerland’s interests went beyond trade because of ‘the fact that we would be affected to a considerable extent in many other areas by the decisions and developments in the EEC even if we were not to participate in the integration efforts’ (Swiss Federal Council 1971: 103). This was confirmed by the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry, ‘Switzerland’s foreign trade is very heavily dependent on the European markets, which make numerous commentators say that our country was, already, one of the most integrated in Europe’ (Junod 1971: 31).

For years economic relations between Bern and Brussels were based on the FTA, amended by several other agreements, so that by 1992 the Swiss had about 190 mainly economic and technical agreements with the EC. Switzerland was drawn into the European issue via the backdoor through her economic relations because the country had to open up to Europe in order to sustain economic growth and prosperity at home. In pursuit of her economic interests Switzerland was forced to adapt directly and indirectly one-step at a time. Even without contractual obligation, the Swiss unilaterally adopted EC-regulations as far as they concerned the market. Furthermore, the Federal Council decided in 1988 that every new law had to be vetted for EC-compatibility and declared:

…the renunciation of accession to the EC has an institutional price, which today undoubtedly carries more weight than in 1972: Switzerland is thereby excluded from the formal EC decision making process, a process by which, on the other hand, it is more and more affected as a result of the EC enlargements and the extension of EC competencies (Swiss Federal Council 1988: 131).
Taking into account the extent of Europeanisation, the fact that Switzerland faced recession and rising unemployment, and that European integration had become more Swiss-style by introducing the subsidiarity principle, the government decided to accede to the European Economic Area (EEA) and in September 1991 even switched to membership as the priority solution in Swiss-EU relations, thereby corroborating Mattli’s (1999) statement that a country applies for membership after one or more years of growth rates below the average of the member states. But after an emotional campaign the EEA agreement was rejected by public referendum in December 1992, and the EU-application was put on hold.

Since then the Swiss government’s aim has been to obtain equivalent access to the internal market through the negotiation of bilateral sectoral agreements. Access to a market as huge and powerful as the EU has its price, however: the bilateral agreements not only cover additional economic interests but also extend cooperation to the fields of internal security, asylum and other issues that highlight just how far Europeanisation has progressed in Switzerland. Moreover, Europeanisation continues, as is shown by the next areas up for negotiation: In March 2008, the Federal Council adopted a negotiating mandate on free trade in the agricultural and food sector as well as on health care. Additionally, four other areas (emission trading, Galileo, cooperation with EDA and peace keeping operations) are on the agenda.

How Europe Is Instrumental In Bringing About Change (Again)

The present Swiss way of negotiating bilateral sectoral agreements and avoiding formal integration is nothing new in Swiss-European relations. It is the pre-1992 strategy adapted to changed requirements. Switzerland has been concluding sectoral, intergovernmental agreements with unifying Europe since contracting with the ECSC regarding supplies in 1956. Current relations resemble Switzerland’s aborted 1961 attempt “for a form of association with the EEC that would leave neutrality, federalism and direct democracy untouched” (Swiss Federal Council 1962: 281; Zbinden 1992) and the middle course between accession and isolation agreed in 1972. But since the EU has changed from a mere economic area to a political entity, its relations with Switzerland have had to change, too. The gradual intensification of European integration represented a challenge to the political experience of Switzerland since policy areas that had been exclusively in the cantonal domain became subject to European integration, “(f)or the first time in the history of the Swiss federation, non-central governments became involved in international negotiations, which previously had been a prerogative of the central government” (Kux 1998: 169). New layers of politics evolved and upset the federal balance. Moreover, since a constitutional amendment in 1977 which gave people the final say in important for-
eign policy decisions,\textsuperscript{17} Swiss EU policy is subject to direct democracy (Kreis 1995) – an aspect of Swiss-EU relations that cannot be overestimated as the European issue is largely responsible for political divisions, especially concerning the rise of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) that is politicising against EU-membership and constantly calling for referenda on EU-issues.

Given its geographical position, Switzerland is deeply enmeshed in EU policies and, due to the country’s extremely export-oriented economy, is quite easily convinced (or, to put it bluntly, blackmailed) by the EU to adapt to its norms. With European integration on the political agenda (again), extra-parliamentary movements, once an active element in the political system, have re-emerged. Resurrecting the ?Europa-Union?, the New European Movement Switzerland was constituted in 1998 by merging a number of pro-European movements.\textsuperscript{18} What is different is that most of the newly-established campaigning organisations do not support but oppose EU entry, most strikingly the AUNS,\textsuperscript{19} which does not mince its words, exploits emotive issues like the loss of Swiss liberty and portrays itself as the defender of Swiss identity. EU-philes and EU-phobes alike, and to a certain extent also middle-of-the-road EU-sceptics,\textsuperscript{20} exploit the European Union in handling Swiss domestic political and cultural conflicts. According to Kux (1998: 179) “the emergence of these para-party structures means that political conflicts can no longer be resolved within the traditional institutions, but are decided at the ballot”, entailing a shift from representative to direct democratic decision-making in European affairs as well as keener competition among the parties and a general polarisation of politics – a decrease in consensus that has meanwhile affected the composition of the magic formula.\textsuperscript{21} Europeanisation is exploited by domestic politicians and interest groups to further their goals and thereby accounts for a changed empowerment of actors and a redistribution of power (Green-Cowles 2000: 11) as Switzerland experienced with the SVP’s Christoph Blocher and the afore-mentioned change in the magic formula. As in every other European country – EU member or not – the process of European integration leads to political mobilisation (Sciarini et al. 2002). To avoid further strife among linguistic groups (French cantons are mainly pro EU, German ones oppose it)\textsuperscript{22} the government recently withdrew completely from being committed to full EU membership as a long-term objective.

Having withdrawn from a first tentative, transnational movement-based, direct and active involvement in European unification in the 1940s, the Swiss had only sought economic cooperation thereafter, “a very satisfactory relationship with Europe” because “(t)his gave them the economic benefits they needed without demanding clear political commitment” (Church, 1996: 13). Accordingly, the Swiss Integration Office is still under the control of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Economic Affairs, which may mirror the wish of the majority to go it alone in all areas except the economy, but which makes life difficult for the government in the
light of advances in European integration. Rapprochements to the EU are sometimes seen as an institutional phasing-in, as integration by stealth, which accounts for the ongoing alienation of the classe politique and the people. Indeed, the European issue has become the crucial divisive factor in Swiss politics and is central to people’s voting decisions in national parliamentary elections as SELECTS (Swiss electoral studies) show. Some already see Swiss social integration at risk. Such alienation is evidence of Europeanisation seen as modernisation or assimilation, as “a process whereby national political elites began to re-conceive of national interests relative to a broader European framework. Europeanisation […] emerged as a modernisation process spearheaded by national political and bureaucratic elites” (Harmsen and Wilson 2000: 21), which only much later percolates down more generally into Swiss society.

Including a historical view in Europeanisation studies allows us to see that Switzerland is not that special concerning Europeanisation, indeed is overall less distinctive than commonly thought. It is the narrowness of the mainstream concept focused on the membership criteria, neglecting a historical and functional approach that makes Switzerland look like an exception when it comes to Europeanisation. But the changes Switzerland is undergoing today are not new; in many respects they are a return to former attempts at adaptation and normalisation in European affairs. The establishment of an Integration Office in 1961 meant reforming the machinery of government as did the opening of a Delegation of the European Commission in 2007, the most recent evidence of normalisation by Europeanisation. Moreover, elite socialisation in European affairs, i.e., elite Europeanisation, is not only furthered by re-orientating the diplomatic service or by new objectives for the army (Ehs 2005b), but also by business people who have to be familiar with Community rules, by Swiss lawyers who now have to be trained in EC law, and by students and academics Europeanised through Switzerland’s participation in European higher education.

Like any other country, Switzerland carries out its domestic adaptation “with national colours” (Green-Cowles et al. 2000: 1): incrementally, deliberately, with special regard for domestic cohesion. Broad consensus takes precedence over accelerated progress in EU relations in order to forestall a referendum challenge. If we maintain that “Swiss ways are not always very open and competitive” as does Church (2002b: 142), “Europeanisation is a way of revitalising them” we might well add and of normalising them, too. The bottom line is that the adjustments made at the Swiss national level in order to accommodate to new situations were and are for the most part directly linked to the advancement of European projects, thus proving the hegemonic power of European unification as it exerts passive pressure to adapt. This has been observed – and exaggerated as well as exploited – by many EU-phobes and contributes to deep-rooted EU-scepticism among the Swiss. It is very likely
that such pressures on Switzerland to Europeanise will become more frequent as the European Union expands and integrates further, which makes Church (2004a: 223) think it feasible that Switzerland “could get sucked in by Europeanisation.”

Moreover, the hegemonic pressure causes the government to adopt a very cautious communication strategy as regards EU-issues, as can be observed at present in the controversy on company-tax breaks:25 Hans-Rudolf Merz, minister of finance, said from the start of this dispute that it would be dishonourable for a sovereign state like Switzerland to negotiate with the EU on tax rules, but promptly announced an autonomous fiscal reform ‘that would fulfil the EU’s requirements’ (NZZ 28/29 April 2007: 33). How ‘autonomous’ is a reform linked to a demand by the European Union, which has the power to suspend negotiations for cooperation in other desired areas? Is it not actually a reform in response to Europeanisation? Or take the in 2009 upcoming voting decision concerning the continuation of the agreement concerning the free movement of persons:26 Practically, the Swiss cannot say ‘No’ since the EU reserves the right to trigger the ‘guillotine clause’, thus putting an end to the whole Bilateral Agreement I (liberalisation and market opening) as its accords are legally linked – a horror vision for Swiss economy.

Conclusion

The Swiss case helps us conceptualise Europeanisation. If we are interested in “whether and how the ongoing process of European integration has changed nation-states, their domestic institutions, and their political cultures” (Green Cowles et al. 2000: 1), we must not neglect non-member states or the pre-membership history of current member states. The depth and structure of Switzerland’s relationship with the unified Europe may be new but the Europeanisation of Switzerland itself is not. The country’s current incremental way back to the European mainstream offers insights into the hegemonic power of European unification. Moreover, the example of Switzerland sheds light on the manifold paths to European integration and on the impact the choices made at each crossroads had and has for the countries of Europe.

Permitting scrutiny of the antecedents of the European Union and a functional approach leaving aside questions of formal membership will also contribute to a better understanding of differentiated integration, a trend that will continue in the future. On the one hand, enlargement has already increased the EU’s heterogeneity and will increase it further, thereby affecting its effectiveness and its very character (Gstöhl 2002: 223). On the other hand, there will be more states Europeanised on a functional level – as is already the case in Switzerland – without participating in institutions, Turkey would be a case in point here. Although we have to be methodologically careful concerning the selection of control cases (Haverland 2005) the
Swiss example may remind us “that integration in Europe is a broader and less formal process than some EU specialists assume” (Church 2002a: 15). Being inextricably linked to unified Europe, Switzerland has little alternative but to adapt to Community rules, whereby adaptation is and will be determined by the pace of incremental change in the Swiss system.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the EUSA 10th Biennial Conference in Montréal in May 2007, where I received most helpful comments from Jonathan Davidson and Melvin R. Schlein. I am also very grateful to all who commented on this paper, in particular I thank Thomas Brückner and two anonymous reviewers. Moreover, I thank the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research (BMWF) and the Austrian Political Science Association (AUPSA) for their support.

2 Such a perspective only seemed ripe for investigation in recent years. We can now observe a growing number of studies dedicated to the impact of European integration at the national level and a race to theorise Europeanisation; see e.g. Börzel (2001), Knill (2001) and Graziano and Vink (2007).

3 Cf. to studies concerned with Europeanisation in post-communist countries (Henderson 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Mansfeldová, Sparschuh and Wenninger 2005).

4 This is a problem concerning the developing research agenda that is also pointed out by Graziano and Vink (2007: 11) in their comprehensive overview of Europeanisation research, deploring that ‘it seems that the concept of Europeanization is monopolized by scholars of the unification process between the member states of the European Union, and concentrates on adaptations to Brussels.’ – That’s why Radaelli (2003: 27) preferred to speak of ‘EU-isation’ and Kohler-Koch (2000: 21) used the term ‘EU-Europäisierung’ when the general notion ‘European’ became subject to change and was appropriated by the EU. Vink (2003: 65) points out that politically unified Europe does not just consist of the EU but also of institutions such as the OSCE, EFTA or the Council of Europe.

5 See e.g. Lavenex (2004, 2007) who is most explicit in her call for attention to be paid to the extra-territorial impact of European integration.

6 The expression ‘indirect Europeanisation’ was coined by Radaelli (1997) to describe what he later (2000) called ‘policy isomorphism’ but unfortunately restricted to EU member states; policy areas where (member) states have begun to emulate one another regarding particular policy choices or regulatory frameworks. The expression ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ is also used as a synonym for ‘indirect Europeanisation’.

7 As first noted by Steppacher (1992) and later thoroughly analysed by Kux (1998), Church (2000a), Fischer (2005), and most recently in a volume edited by Church (2007).

8 Despite the fact that Europeanisation runs in both directions and both are under-researched in the case of Switzerland, the author chose to focus on the dominant one, downward causation, given that space is limited here.

9 For further details see e.g. Jílek (1990) and Ehs (2005a, 2006).
On the issue of neutrality and the army as identity-related elements see also Haltiner (2002).

See e.g. Federal President Etter's speech 'Die Europäische Sendung der Schweiz' (Switzerland's European mission) in January 1939 for the purpose of Geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual national defence).

For further details on the years 1947 till 1960 see e.g. Maurhofer (2001) and in general Gstöhl (2002) and Gabriel and Fischer (2003).

This guideline on neutrality was issued by the Swiss Foreign Ministry in 1954 in reaction to the ECSC, stating that, 'an economic neutrality exists only in so far as the permanently neutral state may not conclude a customs or economic union with another state, since this would mean that the neutral state would more or less renounce its independence in political matters as well' (Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1954: 11).

The term 'foreign judges' features in a somewhat populist equation of European integration with the time when Switzerland was under Habsburg rule.

Its main task was and is to improve co-operation among different ministries concerned with EU-issues, to monitor the European integration process and to analyse and assess its likely consequences for Switzerland.

This policy line never materialised at the external level since France's veto on the British membership application put relations with all EFTA members on hold (Dupont and Sciarini 2001: 215).

Accession to organisations for collective security (e.g. UN) and to supranational communities (e.g. the EC) was made subject to mandatory referendum.

A fact obviously ignored by Flood (2002) who thinks of Switzerland not being in need of a campaigning anti-EU force because for him the country has an anti-European consensus.


On this tripartite distinction see Church (2004: 270).

The magic formula guaranteed all four main parties power in a grand coalition by sharing the posts in a way that mirrored the linguistic and political landscape. It is commonly held that the old formula, in place from 1959 to 2004, had brought Switzerland stability and prosperity. Before December 2003, two Federal Counsellors were elected each from the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Free Democrats and one from the Swiss People's Party. Under the new magic formula starting in January 2004, the new party composition of the cabinet changed to: 1 Christian Democrat, 2 Social Democrats, 2 Free Democrats, and 2 representatives of the Swiss People's Party.

On the origins of Euro-scepticism in German-speaking Switzerland see Theiler (2004).

The Swiss army has been providing assistance in the Balkans within the framework of ESDP since the Federal Council adopted a new strategy ‘Security through cooperation’ and placed civilian police officers at the disposal of the EU Peace Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia.

Perceived passive pressure by the EU even led AUNS-president Schwander (2007: 5) to accuse the EU of ‘colonialism’ and ‘Euro-imperialism’.

In February 2007, the European Commission accused Switzerland of offering unfair company-tax advantages that violate the FTA, a complaint rejected by the Swiss. To date the dispute is still not settled.

The agreement, which was negotiated for an initial period of seven years, has been in force since 1 June 2002. Switzerland must inform the EU in writing by 31 May 2009 at the latest on whether it agrees to continue it.
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