

Selection of Candidates to the European Parliament in the Main Czech Political Parties¹

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Abstract: *This paper analyses the candidate selection procedure in political parties before the elections to the European Parliament. It focuses on the four main Czech political parties: the ČSSD, the KDU-ČSL, the KSCM and the ODS. After describing the selection procedure based on written documents (party statutes and statutes governing candidate selection procedure), the authors analyse candidate selection using the classification framework established by Gideon Rahat and Reuven Hazan. This framework emphasises the four dimensions of a candidate selection method: candidacy, party selectorates, decentralisation, and voting/appointment systems. Findings from the analysis of written documents are compared with results from a questionnaire survey among candidates. Candidate selection in the ČSSD and the ODS was centralised around a narrow central executive with a closed candidacy only for party members. On the other hand, candidate selection in the KDU-ČSL and the KSCM was more decentralised with final decisions taken by wide central party bodies.*

Keywords: *candidate selection, European Parliament elections, party organisations, Czech political parties*

1. Introduction

Candidate selection methods in political parties for individual elections and the definition of the selection rules are basic areas of intra-party conflict, particularly if we understand the participation in elections and peopling of public positions as one of the defining char-

acteristics of the conduct of political parties and its members.¹ Decisions on who will be nominated in elections as a candidate of a given party is a source of conflict among many interested actors. Decision-making on nominations, i.e., the candidate selection method, is also the basic tool for controlling a political party and its policies. To put it simply, whoever controls candidate selection in their party decides not only on who will hold public office but also indirectly on the policy of a party and its implementation. The fact that candidates in political parties are chosen among a larger number of interested actors and that their rank is defined leads to the fact that candidate selection rules must provide selective advantages to certain candidates over others,² e.g., to those who are chosen by the party chairman or those who are able to secure support of representatives of individual regions in a given constituency, or on the contrary to those who are able to persuade all members of a party in the event of direct election of candidates. In this sense, candidate selection rules provide certain groups in a party (whether candidates, party bodies or party members) with selective advantages, which usually reflect intra-party politics and intra-party power relations.

Candidate selection for Parliament is analysed in literature from two basic points of view (for an overview see Norris, Lovenduski 1995).³ The primary questions are who chooses and how candidates are chosen (Gallagher, Marsh 1988; Katz, Mair 1992; Norris 1997; Rahat, Hazan 2001). These authors concentrate on traditional topics of party organisation research and strive to identify power centres within political parties, who controls candidate selection and how the system of decision-making changes over time. These studies concentrate on gradual steps in the candidate selection process, on whether it is the central party leadership, representatives of regions, the rank and file or other party bodies and levels that make the decisions on candidate selection, and finally on what can be gleaned from a given manner of candidate selection concerning the intra-party distribution of power and the party itself.

Another aspect of the study of candidate selection is seeking answers to the questions why and who has been selected and possibly whether who has been selected has any influence on the functioning of the political institution to which the elections are held. This range of studies includes texts on the sociology of political elites which strive to identify trends in changes in the composition of parliaments from various perspectives, such as sex, age, education, profession or political experience of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the party or in elected positions (for example Best, Cotta 2000). Because of the complicated nature of such research, far fewer studies concentrate on whether candidates nominated by a party systematically differ from those who were not selected (Holland 1981), or whether social features of MPs have any influence on their political behaviour (Norris, Lovenduski 1995: 209–225; Karvonen, Selle 1995). These studies touch upon the basic issue of the theory of representative democracy because who and how MPs represent is strongly determined by who chooses them.

In this text we will limit ourselves to the first type of study of candidate selection, which will make it possible for us to concentrate on candidate selection strategies in individual political parties and will help us in the study of how Czech political parties organise and which bodies have power in a party. We shall concentrate our attention on the four strongest parliamentary parties, the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL), the Communist Party of Bohemia

and Moravia (KSČM) and the Civil Democratic Party (ODS). We shall first describe the legal framework in which the selection of candidates for the European Union elections occurred. In the following part we will focus on candidate selection structures, i.e., how and who selects the candidates. In the next part we follow up on the description of the nomination processes in individual parties and use the classification put forth by Gideon Rahat and Reuven Hazan, which provides a tool to compare candidate selection in the Czech parties studied. Results of the analysis of documents are then compared with results of a questionnaire survey among candidates to the European Parliament (EP).

2. The Legal Framework for Candidate Selection in Political Parties: The Electoral System

Candidate selection rules are heavily structured by legal norms. These are more formalised than intra-party rules for candidate selection because they have the power of law. From this perspective they are more stable and less prone to change. Moreover, they structure intra-party competition similarly in all parties, which may contribute to the homogenisation of the rules of candidate selection in the parties under study. In the case of the election of Czech representatives to the EP, such norms are primarily the Act on Political Parties and the Act on the Elections to the European Parliament.⁴ Neither of these acts regulates the course of candidate selection although they do set forth concrete procedural election rules. These acts structure candidate selection by setting the size of the constituency, the number of seats and the election mechanism as well as by setting the criteria of eligibility and incompatibility of the mandate. The selection process is indirectly regulated by the agreements on European Communities (the European Union) which set the number of mandates allocated for representatives elected in the Czech Republic and, at the same time, define the powers of the EP, by which they set the degree of interest among politicians in the nomination and election.⁵

The criteria of eligibility contain the standard age requirement, non-felon requirement, and citizenship requirement and are not significantly restrictive. On the contrary, the rule of incompatibility for the member of the European Parliament (MEP) mandate significantly restricts the range of active politicians who wish to run in the EP elections. The fact that the MEP's office is incompatible with the post of a minister in the Czech cabinet or the office of a Member of a national Parliament or Senator, together with the scope of power of the EP, reduces politicians' interest in this office. If a politician wants to remain active at the national level, he cannot become a MEP. This, among other reasons, is the motive why, out of all ruling parties, not a single member of the cabinet ran for the office of MEP and why no chairman of a political party or only three deputy chairmen ran among top representatives of parliamentary political parties.

The basic features of the electoral system structure the process of candidate selection even more. Only political parties and their coalitions can be nominated in elections; in consequence this means that the selection of all candidates occurs only within running parties.

This model usually gives an advantage to members of political parties because parties usually set membership in the party as one of the criteria of nomination.⁶ The basic characteristic, which structures the candidate selection territorially, is the number of constituencies, or the number of ballots that a party registers for the elections. In the case of the EP elections, a single constituency was defined, which means that at national level parties were preparing only one candidate list. In the 1994 European Election Study candidates were asked to define the influence of party bodies on candidate selection in their parties along a ten-point scale. Analyses showed that where there was a single constituency, the mechanism of candidate selection was centralised unlike countries with more constituencies (Norris 1996: 199–200). Therefore we could expect centralisation of candidate selection in the Czech Republic.

The number of seats distributed in the European Parliament elections was small (a total of 24) in the Czech Republic; as a result, the number of electable positions and thus certain positions on candidate lists was limited. In view of the fact that the constituency consisting of the entire Czech Republic was relatively large (compared to the size of constituencies in other types of elections), what turned out to be an important presupposition for the election campaign strategy was that voters will identify less with candidates and thus that they will tend to use preferential votes less (compare Katz 1980: 30–31). Thus, the first rank on the candidate list appeared to be important factor for the election to the European Parliament.⁷ Results of public opinion polls conducted at the time when the candidate selection was being completed suggested that, with the exception of the ODS, the first two candidates would be electable in parties that could cross the five-percent threshold; in the ČSSD and the KSČM it was a maximum of four candidates. This fact dynamised the entire candidate selection process because all those interested concentrated on the few electable positions. On the other hand, the limited number of electable positions restricted in advance the interest of some politicians who gave up the fight in which the chance of winning was low. Moreover, in some parties the strategic selection of a candidate list leader was decided in advance as a result of the presentation of future leaders and the support provided to them by the party leadership (see, for example, the case of Jan Zahradil from the ODS or Miloslav Ransdorf from the KSČM).

3. The Structure of Candidate Selection or Who Selects and How

The basic candidate selection rules are usually described in intra-party documents such as election rules or candidate selection statutes. They are supplemented by practices as these rules are brought to life. These practices may lead to different implementation of the same rules even within one party. These can include agreements of representatives of individual regional organisations within a party (known are regional or county agreements) or unwritten rules about the fact that wishes or recommendations made by certain people, for example important intra-party actors, be observed. On the other hand, a public refusal of support for

a candidate before the selection by any of the leading representatives of a party can play the very opposite role. In analysing and classifying candidate selection we rely largely on written rules of candidate selection. These make it possible for us to analyse how parties organise themselves and what strategies they use. At the same time, however, we are using information about the real functioning of those rules although we are aware that in some cases it is difficult to uncover these practices.


3.1 The ODS

The power to nominate candidates for elections to the European Parliament in the ODS rests with bodies at the lowest organisational level, i.e., local conventions. Proposals for nomination do not have to be necessarily restricted to members of the local convention; conventions can propose candidates from other party branches. Civic Democrats see the European elections as a purely party affair, which means that only party members can be nominated. The ODS does not define any other criteria related to political activities of the candidates but requires that the nominees speak at least one world language, they must submit a negative 'lustration' certificate and there is a non-felon requirement.

Local conventions made decisions by the voting of a majority of those present. They submit their nominations to county conventions, which assess them but do not have the option to add any other names. They vote independently on each proposal; to confirm a nomination a simple majority of those present is required. Further reduction of the number of candidates occurs at the level of regional conventions. No more than four candidates, ranked by regional conventions, can have been nominated for each region in the final stage of decision-making. Voting occurs similar to the county level. Nominations for the leader of a candidate list are submitted separately and each is voted on separately. The National Executive Committee of the party, which according to the Rules for Drawing Candidate Lists 'draws the order of candidates including substitutes and approves the ballot as a whole,' determines the final candidate list.

The ODS Voting Rules do not specify in what manner the National Executive Committee reaches the final candidate list. According to the party statutes the National Executive Committee decides through a simple majority vote of the members present. Formally speaking, it is not clear whether each nomination is voted on separately and in what manner the National Executive Committee determines the rank of candidates. It, however, follows from the above-mentioned provision that the National Executive Committee votes only on a previously drawn complete candidate list. The actual course of the decision-making on the candidate list in 2004 corresponded to this: the National Executive Committee voted on a prepared proposal as a whole and the proposal was drafted by the ODS Presidium. The rules obligate the National Executive Committee to 'take into account a regional balance' and the rank defined by the regional conventions. The process of proposing and selecting candidates in the ODS occurs in four stages. Such a complex model is unique among the studied parties; other parties use two- to three-stage systems.

Figure 1 – Scheme for Candidate Nomination and Selection for the 2004 EP Elections in the ODS



Source: Rules for Drawing the ODS Candidate List for the EP Elections.


3.2 The KSČM

The right to nominate candidates in the KSČM can be exercised by all party bodies regardless of their position in the intra-party hierarchy as well as by parliamentary party groups, MPs and Senators. In this, they can request the cooperation of civil and interest groups outside the KSČM. Communists are the only party among those studied who expressly allow non-party members to run for the European Parliament on the party ballot. However, such candidates must be active members of civil organisations or interest organisations sympathising with the party. From this perspective Communists are a relatively open grouping. However, the KSČM requires that candidates for the European elections be previously elected in municipal, regional or parliamentary elections. This is a rather restrictive criterion. Furthermore, the party requirement for the payment of a nomination contribution amounting to CZK 10,000 (approx. 350 EUR) can be strongly limiting (other parties also demand a contribution to the campaign but not directly in the rules of nomination – these tend to be unwritten rules).

Party organs submit their nominations to county committees, which assess them, and if they agree with more nominations they rank the candidates. Thus, in the KSČM there is only one revision of the nominations. The KSČM Central Election Committee receives the nominations of Communist candidates and merges them into a national nomination list. The KSČM National Committee, a wide body that is the chief authority at central level between party conventions, selects the candidates and ranks them. Members of the KSČM National Committee have exactly the number of votes, as is the number of names contained on the nomination lists of county organisations. Voting occurs in such a way that the electorate

states the rank next to each proposed name on the candidate list. All the proposed names must be ranked otherwise the ballot is invalid. The election commission adds up the attributed positions of each candidate and drafts the final ranking of the proposed candidates.

Figure 2 – Scheme for Candidate Nomination and Selection for the 2004 EP Elections in the KSCM



Source: Draft of Rules for Ensuring KSCM Primary Elections for the 2004 Elections.

3.3 The ČSSD


In the ČSSD regional committees and the National Executive Committee have the power to nominate candidates; this fact differentiates the party from the rather decentralised manner of proposing and nominating candidates in other parties. The regional committees are the third organisational level (members are elected by county and approved by regional conferences). The ČSSD National Executive Committee is the medium-sized body of party leadership (between the National Committee and the Presidium) and its members are delegated in various ways from several sub-organisational units. Both the regional committees and the National Executive Committee is the executive in the organisational structure of the party, which can be interpreted as a further distancing of the rank and file from the nomination powers.

Each regional committee may propose at most two candidates and the National Executive Committee up to ten candidates. Thus the maximum number of nominations is 38. It is within the power of the National Executive Committee to assess whether proposed candidates meet the qualifications and other requirements, and potentially refuse the nomination. However, neither the Rules of Preparation for the Election nor the party statutes define clearly the requirements placed on candidates. None of the documents restricts the candidacy to only members of the ČSSD; on the other hand, they do not expressly allow the

candidacy of non-party members. The issue of membership does not appear at all among conditions for inclusion on the candidate list. When we examine the final composition of the ballot presented to the voters in 2004, we find only party members. Therefore we can surmise that the absence of any provision on this issue in the party statutes *de facto* means that their authors presumed that only ČSSD members would be nominated. The party does not make the candidacy contingent on any condition that could be considered as an indicator of existing political activity, and besides the knowledge of at least one world language requires a negative “lustration” certificate and a clear criminal record.

After the National Executive Committee assesses the qualifications of those nominated, it drafts a proposal of a candidate list including the ranking and proposes the leader (number one can be also proposed collectively by at least four regional committees). The selection of the candidates rests with the National Committee, i.e., a wider central body the task of which is to decide on the principles of party functioning between conventions. Each member of a selectorate (in this case a member of the National Committee) can give a vote to no more than three nominees. The selectorate does not indicate a ranking of candidates, only their preference. Candidates who secured the support of more than 50 % of the selectorate are ranked according to the number of obtained votes. The list leader is selected separately through an absolute majority vote in which more than 50 % of the members of the National Committee present must vote.

Figure 3 – Scheme for Candidate Nomination and Selection for the 2004 EP Elections in the ČSSD



Source: Rules of Preparation of the ČSSD for the European Parliament Elections.


3.4 The KDU-ČSL

In the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party county conventions collectively submit proposal for candidates, i.e., the ‘legislative’ bodies at the second lowest level of the organisational hierarchy whose delegates are elected by local branches. However, where local branches have less than 200 members, all members are invited to the county convention. In such a case it would be possible, as is the case in the ODS, to speak about a maximally decentralised method of nomination. The National Committee (wide party leadership which is formally the chief body of the party between party conventions) has the power to propose other potential candidates after regional nomination rounds occur.

The Christian Democrats grant the right to be nominated only to their members. At the same time, they require a previous office on a board of representatives at the municipal or regional level or in either the Chamber of Deputies or the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The only reduction of proposals coming from county conventions occurs at regional conventions, which select candidates among the nominees for the national candidate list. The National Committee can add names to the candidate list. County and regional conventions make decisions on individual proposals through a resolution, which must be adopted through a majority vote of all the delegates present.

The selection of candidates, including the ranking, occurs at the party convention. Each convention delegate can give as many votes as equals one-fifth of the nominated candidates on the list. The number of preferences obtained determines the ranking of the candidates on the list. This vote is final and is not subject to any further revision; however, if the candidate list is not filled in this manner, the National Executive Committee can suggest other nominees, which in fact occurred (for more on the selection of the candidates at the KDU-ČSL convention see Linek 2004).

Figure 4 – Scheme for Candidate Nomination and Selection for the 2004 EP Elections in the KDU-ČSL



Source: Rules of Nomination for the Primary Elections for the 2004 European Parliament Elections.

4. Classification of Candidate Selection Models in the European Parliament Elections

Various tools can be used to classify and compare candidate selection mechanisms. One of them is the two-dimensional classification scheme proposed by Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (Norris, Lovenduski 1995) who use two variables: concentration of power inside a party and the degree of formalisation of decision-making. The concentration of power inside a party focuses on whether the process of decision-making is centralised and whether decisions tend to be adopted by central party leadership or, on the contrary, by regional and local leaders and party members. The second dimension – the formalisation of decision-making – concerns whether the process of candidate selection is defined by bureaucratic procedures when each step is explicitly described by internal party rules or whether it is guided by informal rules established through tacit consent. According to the given scheme, the decision-making process of candidate selection can take the form of six combinations: formal-centralised, formal-regionalised, formal-local, informal-centralised, informal-regionalised and informal-local.⁸ This classification allows a relatively gross differentiation of candidate selection procedures in individual parties and can be used especially for international and diachronic comparisons. However, it does not provide sufficient differentiating tools for comparisons of candidate selection procedures among parties in a single election, and therefore we do not consider it appropriate for our purposes.⁹

Another potential classification tool for candidate selection in political parties is the scheme proposed by Gideon Rahat and Reuven Hazan (Rahat, Hazan 1999). These authors differentiate four major variables based on which they classify candidate selection methods adopted by individual parties:

- Eligibility, i.e., who can be nominated (the continuum is defined from a restriction to long-term party members or party functionaries to including sympathisers or independent candidates among potential candidates).
- The body that makes a decision on candidates, i.e., the selectorate¹⁰ (at one end of the continuum is the inclusion of all voters or party members in the selection procedure, through selection in representative organs of a party to selection in executive organs of a party or only by the leadership on the other pole of the continuum).
- Territorial or functional location of candidate selection (this defines the degree of decentralisation of decision-making).
- The mechanism on deciding on candidates (electoral formula or appointment).

Two potential aspects of candidate selection reduce the clarity of Rahat and Hazan's classification, which the authors themselves point to. The first is the multi-stage candidate selection. In this case a candidate must be selected several times; for example, he is nominated at the county level, given a certain rank at the regional level and finally confirmed at the national level. Furthermore, different selection mechanisms may be used at all these levels. Second is the mixed candidate selection system. This is a method in which different potential candidates must meet different conditions or are selected by various selectorates or using

different voting rules at different levels. These problems concern, for example, the different structure of candidate leader selection from the selection of other candidates, or a selection of candidates for unelectable positions on the candidate list.

Despite these difficulties, the advantages of this candidate selection classification predominate, which, next to diachronic and international comparisons, become especially obvious in inter-party comparisons.¹¹ For our classification we will follow Rahat and Hazan's recommendation and limit the classification in multi-stage decision-making only to the level where decisions are made on safe positions on the candidate list. Therefore, although we take into account the number of nomination levels through which candidates have to pass, we only include in the candidate selection mechanism the defining body that makes the final selection and its "distance" from the regular rank and file (in the sense of intra-party hierarchy). In the case of the mixed mechanism, Rahat and Hazan recommend considering the influence of various procedures according to the ratio of safe positions that are peopled through these procedures (Rahat, Hazan 1999: 300).

Maurice Duverger defined a differentiation of positions on candidate lists into safe, competitive and hopeless; according to Duverger candidate selection is primarily about safe and competitive positions and, on the contrary, the hopeless positions are peopled by others to fill the empty positions or as a token of honour. According to Duverger this differentiation makes sense only in parties that secure approximately the same amount of seats in consecutive elections or where the expected election gains can be safely calculated (Duverger 1965: 368–369). Today when regularly published public opinion polls with voter preferences are known, an estimate of the division of these positions is relatively easy. For the purposes of our study we will use the January public opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CVVM) which occurred approximately at the time when the candidate selection procedure in the parties under study was being completed. According to this poll, the five-percent threshold would be passed only by the ODS (with 33 % – 11 seats), the ČSSD (17.5 % – 5 seats), the KSČM (16 % – 5 seats) and the KDU-ČSL (9 % – 3 seats). That would mean that in the ODS positions 1–9 could have been considered safe and positions 10–12 competitive, in the ČSSD and the KSČM positions 1–4 safe and 5–6 competitive and in the KDU-ČSL positions 1–2 safe and positions 3–4 competitive.

4.1 The First Dimension: Who can be selected?

Depending on the type of elections for which a candidate list is being drafted, political parties place certain requirements on candidates. Jeffrey Obler, for example, described the restrictions introduced by the Belgian Socialist Party at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. Potential candidates had to have been a party member at least five years prior to the primary, have been regular customers of the Socialist co-op, have been a regular subscriber to the party's newspaper, have sent their children to state rather than Catholic schools and family members were expected to be members of the appropriate associated party organisations (Obler 1974: 180). The goal of these requirements placed on candidates was to ensure that only active members of the socialist subculture with its values and commitments toward the party were among candidates. In this case, the requirements placed on candidates clearly in-

fluenced a real chance to participate in an intra-party selection. Rahat and Hazan defined the degree of these restrictions along inclusiveness – exclusiveness continuum, where at one end, the inclusive pole, every voter may stand as a party candidate while at the other, exclusive pole of the continuum the party membership restriction is accompanied by other restrictive criteria. US presidential primaries approximate the first case while the above-described model of the Belgian Socialists is an example of an exclusive (and excluding) scheme.

The Czech political parties fairly differ in the demands placed on candidates to the European Parliament elections. Christian and Civic Democrats see the elections as a party matter and do not allow the nomination of non-party members.¹² Although it does not contain such a rule in its voting rules expressly, the ČSSD also nominated only party members for the EP elections. On the contrary, the KSČM declares openness in this respect. Next to party membership some Czech parties define other restrictive requirements placed on candidates (see Table 1).¹³ In view of the different impact of these conditions on the possibility of individuals to be nominated, we distinguish between conditions related to political activity on the one hand and on the other hand conditions without a direct political aspect. The condition of previous political experience enhances the exclusiveness of the intra-party competition and limits the right to candidacy to a group of politically active members; thus, the competition is closed off to other interested parties, for example, party newcomers or sympathisers. The second type of conditions may also pose obstacles for a number of interested parties but these restrictions are more factual in nature and have an equal impact on all party members regardless of their political activity.

Table 1 – Conditions for the Inclusion on a Candidate List for the European Parliament Elections in Selected Parties


	ODS	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL
Party membership	Yes	No	Yes/No	Yes
Conditions related to political activity	None stated	Experience in municipal or regional board of representatives or the Parliament of the CR	None stated	Experience in municipal or regional board of representatives or the Parliament of the CR
Other conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge of at least one world language • Negative lustration certificate • Clear criminal record 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge of at least two world languages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge of at least one world language • Negative lustration certificate • Clear criminal record 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge of at least one world language • Payment of a nomination fee of CZK 10,000

Source: *Rules of nomination and voting of the parties.*

Note: Some political parties mention other requirements placed on candidates. These tend to be, however, declarative criteria such as ‘moral credit’, ‘expertise’ etc. These are not stated in the table. In the case of the ČSSD formal membership is not required but in practice it is. The opposite situation occurred in the KDU-ČSL, which placed non-party members on the candidate list although the nomination rules do not allow this.

Based on these criteria we can place individual parties along a continuum expressing their approach to the issue of who will be allowed to participate in the intra-party competition (see Figure 5). Thanks to the absence of “political” demands, Civic and Social Democrats are most inclusive in this respect. Although they appear to occupy practically the same position, we have placed the ČSSD closer to the inclusiveness pole; although required in practice; the membership condition is not formally embedded in the party documents. The KSČM is located in the exclusivity spectrum although it allows the candidacy of non-party members (Vladimír Remek, who is not a member, even ranked second on the ballot). The condition of experience in a board of representatives on a municipal, regional or even Parliamentary level is more restrictive than the requirement of party membership because a person’s will is not sufficient to meet this condition and if any of the above-mentioned elections are not held at the period before the candidate selection to the EP elections, this condition is impossible to meet for a person never active in politics before. The most exclusive model is applied by Christian Democrats who demand both membership and meeting political and other conditions. Although the nomination rules of the KDU-ČSL make it possible to nominate only party members, the national committee peopled positions that remained empty after the election of candidates by the party convention with non-party members. In view of the fact that these were unelectable positions we place the KDU-ČSL at the end of the spectrum.

Figure 5 – Position of the Parties along an Inclusive – Exclusive Continuum According to Candidacy Criteria



Source: authors.


4.2 The Second Dimension: Who Selects Candidates?

The *inclusiveness – exclusiveness* continuum also defines the second dimension, which classifies to who political parties grant the right to contribute to candidate selection. An extreme case of exclusiveness is a model where a single party representative, for example the party chairman, makes a decision on nominations. As Rahat and Hazan state, such a situation used to exist in some Israeli religious parties where prominent religious leaders held this exclusive position. On the contrary, some states in the US grant the right to vote to all citizens regardless of a strict link to a party. Between these two poles of the continuum there is a number of other ways of defining the selectorate. Closer to the inclusiveness pole is the party member zone, which can be distinguished according to active party members or members

paying membership dues. In the middle between the two poles we can place selected party agency where candidates are selected by elected party organs and closer to the exclusiveness pole is non-selected agency zone where candidates are selected by unelected party organ members of which are nominated by another party organ or an individual.


Czech parties use elected party organs, which are national committees (ČSSD and KSČM), national executive committees (ODS) and party conventions (KDU-ČSL). These elected bodies differ in terms of the manner in which members are nominated or in which nominations are mediated. The *more inclusive party bodies* include various nomination conventions where delegates have a direct mandate from a portion of the rank and file they represent. *Less inclusive party bodies* are such whose members are selected through intermediary practices, e.g., by delegates elected at lower levels of the organisational structure. It also applies that if these bodies are relatively large (numerous), it is an indicator of *inclusiveness*. The same is true if the distance of the rank and file from the body that makes the selection is short, i.e., if it is simple to become a selector. On the contrary, decisions made by narrow committees with intermediary nomination of members indicate *exclusiveness*. Figures 6 to 9 identify party bodies that have the final say in candidate selection and depict the shortest possible path for a regular member to participate in such a selectorate body. The interrupted arrows in these pictures show a manner of election of individual party bodies, full arrows show where the selection of the final selectorate occurs. Thus, in the case of the ČSSD (Figure 6) the full arrow connects county conventions with the National Committee, which means that county conventions have the power to select party members whom they delegate to the National Committee, i.e., they decide on who will be among the selectorate putting together the candidate list. Although the National Committee is also peopled through other procedures (for example, members of the National Executive Committee automatically become its members), the picture shows the *shortest possible* way to the election body from the perspective of a regular member. The interrupted line in the same picture shows that members of county conventions are selected among members of local and county branches.

Figure 6 – Distance of the Rank and File from the Election Body in the ČSSD




Source: Party Statutes.

Figure 7 – Distance of the Rank and File from the Election Body in the ODS




Source: Party Statutes.

Figure 8 – Distance of the Rank and File from the Election Body in the KDU-ČSL



Source: Party Statutes.

Figure 9 – Distance of Rank and File from the Election Body in the KSČM




Source: Party Statutes.

The schemes show that when assessing *inclusiveness* and *exclusiveness* of the range of the selectorate, it is necessary to take into account several layers of the issue. Firstly, all parties with the exception of the KDU-ČSL select the selectorate at one level and from this perspective we could consider them to be inclusive. However, in the ODS, for example, this one-stage selection occurs in the regional convention, i.e., in a body from which a regular member is distanced through two intra-party elections. Secondly, although the choice of the selectorate is one-stage in the parties (and two-stage in the case of Christian Democrats), unofficially it is usually pre-negotiated with party bodies at lower levels. Although informal, selection indeed occurs also here. Therefore we hold that it is necessary to take into account a combination of these two aspects when applying the second dimension of Rahat and Hazan's method. Thirdly, in the case of the ODS and the ČSSD the schemes shown above simplify the situation a bit when they identify as crucial the National Executive Committee and the National Committee respectively. Although the final vote does take place in these bodies, this occurs after an agreement is reached in the narrower party leadership, i.e., in the ČSSD National Executive Committee and in the ODS Presidium. All these three levels will be taken into account when placing the parties along the inclusiveness – exclusiveness axis (Figure 10).

The most *inclusive* is the KDU-ČSL model because the rank of the nominated candidates is determined through a vote at the Party Convention, i.e., the widest body of the party, which represents the legislative power in the horizontal organisational scheme. In the KDU-ČSL a regular member can become a delegate to the Convention through two intra-party elections; in small counties it is necessary to succeed in one selection process only. In the KSČM and the ČSSD the models of candidate selection do not seemingly differ. The final selection rests with the National Committee. These are central institutions in both the parties; both the Committees are, however, wider forums assuming the function of a chief body between party conventions. In both parties the selectorate, members of the Commit-

tees, are selected through a one-stage procedure at the county level. Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference between the ČSSD and KSČM models. In the ČSSD the National Executive Committee presents a prepared candidate list including the ranking to members of the National Committee and the selectorate has only a limited power to change it. Although members of the National Committee make a decision on the leader of the candidate list, the interference of the National Executive Committee moves the ČSSD toward the exclusiveness pole in the schematic depiction of the nature of the election body. In the ODS the final vote on candidates rests with the National Executive Committee. It has a similar position as the central bodies do among the Social Democrats and Communists. Despite this we place the ODS in this scheme the closest to the *exclusiveness* pole because members of the National Executive Committee are recruited through nominations at regional conventions, i.e., in regional organs, which is the furthest from the regular rank and file among all the studied parties. Nominations for a member of the National Executive Committee coming from regional conventions are, according to the statutes, subject to election at a party convention, but this is only a formal step--nominees are not selected at the party convention.


Figure 10 – Position of the Parties along the Inclusive – Exclusive Continuums According to the Nature of the Final Selection Body



Source: authors.

By combining the first and second dimension we obtain a more exact idea of the nature of candidate selection (see Figure 11). The high degree of inclusiveness in one dimension combined with a strong exclusiveness in another means that a party applies a great deal of regulation in the process of proposing and selecting candidates. In the case of the KDU-ČSL the body that makes a decision on the candidacy may be relatively inclusive, but the exclusiveness regarding candidacy shows that the party retains a degree of control over who is nominated. In the case of the ČSSD and the ODS where the candidacy is restricted to party members, the type of body that makes a decision on the candidacy moves both the parties among subjects with an exclusive selection method.

Figure 11 – Position of Parties along the Inclusive – Exclusive Continuum According to the Nature of the Final Selection Body



Source: authors.

4.3 The Third Dimension: Territorial and Corporate (De)Centralisation

In terms of decentralisation we can assess candidate selection methods in terms of *territorial* decentralisation and *corporate* decentralisation. Territorial decentralisation means such an arrangement that ensures that regions are represented or an arrangement in which candidate lists are decided on at the lowest possible level, which according to Rahat and Hazan is an even stronger mark of decentralisation. Corporate decentralisation means that the selection method takes into account status characteristics. According to which group a party intends to prefer, functional representation for representatives of groups such as women, national or ethnic minorities etc. are ensured.

There are two ways to ensure functional representation. Either a given group represents an independent nomination unit and so candidates and the selectorate belong to the same

sector or social group; or a certain number of places on the candidate list are reserved for representatives of the sector or social group. While the first mechanism decentralises both the candidacy and the selectorate, the second method requires that those candidates who are eligible for the reserved places compete for their place on the list against the other candidates and are selected by the entire selectorate. Only if they do not succeed in the nomination, the reservation mechanism is applied so that a given quota may be met. In this model only candidacy is decentralised.

If candidates are selected exclusively at the national level (regardless of how the selectorate is determined), the selection method is located on the *centralisation* pole. On the contrary, if the selection occurs exclusively at the level of local or functional units, the model falls within the *decentralisation* category.


The nomination mechanism in the ODS does not contain any reservation of positions on the candidate lists in terms of functional representation. In terms of regional representation, the rules bind the National Executive Committee to “take into account regional balance” in setting up the candidate ranking and the ranking defined by the regional conventions. Although the ODS declares here clearly the will to respect regional representation, it is a loose formulation that does not institute any obligation of the National Executive Committee. Therefore the party is located closer to the *centralisation* pole in the scheme depicting the territorial aspect.

In the KDU-ČSL a single national nomination list is based on the selection of regional conventions and the National Committee. In section 3.4 we described how candidates are selected and their ranking is done based on the names stated on the nomination list through election at the Party Convention. No places on the candidate list are reserved either in territorial or functional terms. In this respect it is an absolutely centralised selection.

The Voting Rules of the KSČM does not contain any guarantee of representation of regions but it defines in quite some detail the group for functional representation. However, it is only declaratory in nature. According to the document the Central Election Committee is to submit to the National Committee, which decides on the ranking of the candidates, recommendations made by lower party bodies regarding the composition of the list in terms of age, social and professional status and the requirement of “interests and needs of the KSČM, including an appropriate representation of women.” This category does not contain any exact quota. The selection is not subject to any follow-up review and therefore it is not possible to later change the candidate list in terms of increasing the representation of the above-mentioned groups.

The nomination regulations in the ČSSD also refrain from regulating the composition of the candidate lists both in functional and territorial terms. However, the fact that the party defines in its statutes quotas for a minimum representation of women and young members in their bodies may have an indirect effect. In the case of the National Committee which makes the final selection of candidates, women have to represent at least 25% and young members up to the age of 30 at least 10% of members. And thus, in terms of functional representation, the party is located in the middle part determining centralisation (Figure 12).

Figure 12 – Position of parties along a Centralisation – Decentralisation Continuum in Functional and Territorial Terms



Source: authors.

4.4 The Fourth Dimension: Manner of Selection – Voting versus Appointment Systems

Candidate selection is a *voting* system when the number of given votes for individual nominations determines the candidate selection and their ranking, and if two other conditions are met. Firstly, a vote must be held on each single candidate. Therefore it is not possible to have a pre-prepared proposal ratified. Secondly, the election results must be officially presented to justify and legitimate individual candidacies. If the candidate selection method does not meet these criteria, it is an *appointment* system.

Again, we can place individual parties under study on a continuum between two poles according to how they approach the nomination of their candidates. Positioning of a party on this continuum attests to the degree of party control over the composition of the candidate


lists. In a purely *voting* system all candidates are placed on a list according to the number of received nomination votes and no party organ has the power to interfere with thus defined order. On the contrary, in a purely *appointment* system candidates are placed on the candidate lists without the need to secure the agreement of another party organ than the nominating organ. In the middle of this continuum there is a model that combines the two approaches. Such may be when the selectorate votes *en bloc* on a pre-prepared proposal of a list with the ranking of candidates. Because the nomination process in all the Czech political parties under study passes through several levels of organisational structure and in none of them is the voting or appointment procedure the same at all levels, we will restrict our attention, according to Rahat and Hazan's recommendation, to the classification of the selection method at the level where the final selection is made.

The mechanism of shaping the final candidate list is not clearly defined in the ODS. The National Executive Committee defines the ranking of candidates and then votes on the proposal of the list *en bloc*. The Voting Rules obligated the Committee to respect the representation of regions. The candidate list for the 2004 elections did indeed reflect this principle. Members of the Committee (the selectorate) are not therefore completely independent in their nomination decision on the individual level. They should take into account at least the regional aspect; moreover, in the final phase there is a vote on the list *en bloc*. In the scheme depicting the degree of control of party organs over the composition of the list the ODS is located in a position veering slightly from the combined system toward the appointment system.

Similarly, the ČSSD describes in detail the manner of *voting* on the ranking of candidates by members of the National Committee, but also in this case it does not entail a pure form of either of the described models. The National Executive Committee of the party presents the proposal for the composition of the list, including the ranking of candidates, and the selectorate has only a limited power to change it. In this case we are seeing a co-decision of two bodies and a combination of the two methods of nomination. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the National Committee makes a separate decision on the leader through an absolute majority vote. This model entails a compromise between the *voting* and *combined* selection models.

Although in the KSČM and the KDU-ČSL the final candidate selection occurs in different institutions (National Committee in the case of the KSČM and the Party Convention in the case of the KDU-ČSL), the mechanism of selection is very similar. The selectorate mark their preference next to the names of the nominees and the ranking of the candidates is then determined according to the rank of the obtained preferences. The difference is that while among Christian Democrats Convention delegates may give *preferential votes* to a maximum of *one-fifth of candidates*,¹⁴ in the KSČM the selectorate *give ranking to all candidates* on the nomination list. Although in the case of the voting system in the KDU-ČSL there are impulses to create voting majority coalitions, which will decide peopling of all the safe positions, this is also possible in the selection system employed by the KSČM.

Figure 13 – Position of Parties along the Party Representational Control Continuum



5. Evaluation of Candidate Selection for the EP Election through the Candidates' Eyes

The disadvantage of assessing the candidate selection based on document analysis rests in the fact that real processes and practices of candidate selection can differ from those described in rules of voting and nomination.¹⁵ Thanks to a questionnaire survey among candidates of the parties for the European Parliament elections we can assess the selection of candidates based on responses to the question which of the intra-party actors had what influence on candidate selection.¹⁶ On a ten-point scale the candidates were asked to assess what power a given party organ had in selecting candidates. In the KDU-ČSL, KSČM and ODS candidates assess the regional leadership of the party as the most powerful agency. In the ODS, by stressing the role of the regional leadership, the candidates evaluated its role in drafting the proposal of candidates, which each region submitted to the National Executive Committee. At the same time, they assessed the role of regional leadership in negotiations of and voting on the total ranking in the National Executive Committee. On the contrary in the KDU-ČSL and the KSČM the power of the regional leadership can be seen in the negotiation of support during voting at the KDU-ČSL Convention and the KSČM National Committee. When assessing the nominations in the ČSSD candidates evaluated as the most powerful the party leadership, which corresponds to the large powers exercised by the ČSSD National Executive Committee in drafting a proposal of the candidate list then approved by the Presidium (see Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2 – Assessment of the Power of Individual Party Organs in the Candidate Selection Process

	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	KSČM	ODS
	Average / Standard error (N)	Average / Standard error (N)	Average / Standard error (N)	Average / Standard error (N)
Party leadership	2.30 2.50 (10)	3.55 3.55 (11)	2.69 1.89 (13)	3.38 3.42 (8)
Parliamentary party group	3.50 1.77 (8)	5.71 2.43 (7)	4.40 2.68 (10)	5.00 4.10 (6)
Regional party leadership	2.82 2.44 (11)	2.45 1.37 (11)	2.62 2.40 (13)	2.00 1.51 (8)
Local party leadership	6.09 3.18 (11)	3.63 3.11 (8)	2.92 2.35 (12)	2.25 1.58 (8)
Members of the local branch	7.38 1.60 (8)	3.22 2.99 (9)	3.58 2.47 (12)	3.25 1.75 (8)

Source: Questionnaire survey of European Parliament Candidates, 2004. Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences CR.

Note: 1 equals very powerful and 10 equals not powerful at all.

The role of local branches in candidate selection differed in the parties studied, which can also be gleaned from the survey results. ČSSD candidates assessed the power of members of the local branches and of the local leadership to be low while ODS candidates considered the influence of the leadership of the local branches to be the second greatest. The influence on candidate selection of members of local branches in the ODS was assessed as greater than the influence of the party leadership. The role of members of local organisations and their leadership in the KDU-ČSL and the KSČM was assessed as less important. The role of parliamentary party groups in candidate selection was assessed as low with the exception of the ČSSD.

Table 3 – Ranking of the Most Powerful Party Organs in the Candidate Selection Procedure

	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	KSČM	ODS
The first most powerful organ	Party leadership	Regional party leadership	Regional party leadership	Regional party leadership
The second most powerful organ	Regional party leadership	Members of the local branch	Party leadership	Leadership of the local branch
The third most powerful organ	Parliamentary party group	Party leadership	Leadership of the local branch	Members of the local branch

Source: Questionnaire survey of European Parliament Candidates, 2004. Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences CR.

6. Conclusion

The goal of this analysis was to classify, using a single tool, the selection procedures, which the aforementioned parties use (for a summary see Table 4). The ČSSD uses the most exclusive candidate selection method, which has control over who will be nominated to party leadership. The National Executive Committee had the largest influence on the candidate selection and nominated a single candidate for the leader (Libor Rouček) who was elected by a narrow margin in a vote of the National Committee. The ČSSD National Executive Committee also managed to push through its own version of the candidate list in the National Committee. The centralised model of decision-making with strong elements of appointment is usually appropriate for parties mired in fractional strife or for parties with a socially heterogeneous composition of the rank and file, because it is possible to satisfy the demands of individual groups when negotiating the candidate list and the ranking of candidates. Thus the majority does not overrule minorities and their opinions are heard. Although the ČSSD used a model in which the candidate list was shaped before the final vote (see the role of the National Executive Committee), the party leadership used it to promote its own interests instead of striving to reach a consensus, which increased tensions between the opinion streams in the party. Gradually, the main representatives of the intra-party opposition Jan Kavan, Vladimír Laštůvka and Jiří Paroubek resigned from the candidate list in protest against the course of candidate selection.

Table 4 – Classification of Candidate Selection Models according to Rahat and Hazan

	Who can be selected?	Who selects?	De/centralisation of representation	Appointment/voting system
ČSSD	Party members	Indirectly elected body	Territorial centralisation, limited functional decentralisation	Combined
KDU-ČSL	Party members based on criteria	Directly elected body	Territorial and functional centralisation	Election system
KSČM	Party members based on criteria	Directly elected body	Territorial centralisation, limited functional decentralisation	Election
ODS	Party members	Indirectly elected body	Territorial and functional centralisation	Combined

Source: Rules of nomination and election of the parties.

Candidate selection in the ODS was less exclusive than in the ČSSD. In the ODS there were three levels (local, county and regional) at which candidates were selected before the National Executive Committee made a decision on the ranking of the candidates. Therefore, the candidate selection in the ODS contains both elements of decentralisation thanks to the nomination process, and centralisation when a relatively exclusive executive organ of the party at a central level made a decision on the ranking of candidates. This course of

candidate selection in the ODS is strongly influenced by the ODS organisational structure at the central level where it has only two bodies (the Presidium and the National Executive Committee) unlike other parties that have three such bodies. The ODS could potentially have made the final selection of candidates at a non-election party convention that was held in November 2003 approximately two months before the meeting of the National Executive Committee which made a decision on the ranking of candidates. The ODS nevertheless decided not to burden the convention with this decision.

The model of candidate selection in the KDU-ČSL was similar to the model adopted in the ODS for nominating candidates through county and regional conventions; however, it differed in the manner of decision-making and the nature of the body which made the decision. In the case of the KDU-ČSL the convention strongly decentralised the manner of candidate selection. A similar element of decentralisation of decision-making and nominating can be also seen in the KSČM with the difference that the mediating role of the regional level was skipped and the decision on the ranking of the candidates was delegated to the National Committee.

A general overview of the candidate selection models suggests that in the Czech Republic the parties that control the 'quality' of candidates through requirements placed on them may decentralise, at a general level, the decision on candidate selection, or better stated, to delegate it to wider party organs at central levels. On the contrary, parties that do not restrict the candidacy of their own members by other requirements must ensure the approval of the candidates through a system of appointment and centralisation of decision-making. Furthermore, centralisation of decision-making on candidates in the case of the ČSSD and the ODS suggests that these parties take care that candidates selected by them are not only a result of the choices made by party members but that they also represent the party successfully in the elections. The candidate selection mechanisms to the European Parliament elections prompt a consideration as to which organisational type individual parties prefer and represent although it is clear that it is not possible to judge precisely the individual types based on this one aspect. In view of the centralisation of selection and orientation on selection in the ČSSD and the ODS, we can observe a tendency toward election party models (for a typology of mass and election party, see Panebianco 1988) or for cartel parties (Katz, Mair 1995). On the contrary, in the KSČM and the KDU-ČSL the decentralisation of decision-making and a wide participation of the rank and file in the selection suggest that these parties prefer an organisational model oriented on party members and satisfaction of their interests, i.e., a mass party model. At the same time, these parties – although they decentralised the decision-making among numerous bodies – ensured that selected candidates would be selected in the party nomination process by having the leadership of the parties speak several months in advance about Zuzana Roithová and Miroslav Ransdorf respectively as leaders, and by doing so the delegates of the crucial bodies were in effect impelled to respect this selection.

Notes

- ¹ The work of Lukas Linek on this paper was sponsored by the grant no. 1J 004/04-DP1 from Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic.
- ² Theories of political parties distinguish basic motivations in the background of the behaviour of political parties and its members in terms of vote seeking, office seeking and policy-seeking (for example, Strom 1990). From this point of view, candidate selection is crucial for obtaining votes in elections and indirectly for securing an office and influencing policy-making through a choice of candidates capable of negotiation.
- ³ On structural selectivity of institutions and on how institutions strategically privilege certain behaviour and actors over others, see for example Jessop (2000), Hay (2002) or Hay and Wincott (1998).
- ⁴ The following description of the two basic approaches to the study of candidate selection is based on a study conducted by Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 1–18).
- ⁵ Act No. 424/1991 Sb., on the Association in Political Parties and Political Movements, as Amended, and Act No. 63/2003 Sb., on the Elections to the European Parliament and on the Amendment of Some Laws.
- ⁶ Similarly indirectly the intra-party competition is framed by the Constitution which in this case sets the general rules for interpreting legislative norms and which does not provide for any obligations of political parties (for more see Šimíček 1996: 106–107). Candidate selection could be influenced by the constitutional demand of equal access to elect and other public functions (Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights and Freedoms). The article is, however, interpreted according to the constitutional premise that the political system is based on a competition of political parties, i.e., the condition of a candidacy on a party list is not understood as unconstitutional.
- ⁷ The Act on Political Parties restricts membership to individual membership and allows membership only in a single party. The non-existence of penalties and a public party member register, however, provide space for membership in more parties; public activity in more parties is, however, ruled out. Requirements of political parties regarding membership are in principle restricted to the payment of membership fees and the approval of membership by a local branch.
- ⁸ This hypothesis was confirmed because the percentage of preferential votes in the total vote was half that of the 2002 elections to the Chamber of Deputies (Outlý 2004: 135–136). In order to formulate a general conclusion on the nature of preferential voting in this type of elections in the Czech Republic, it will be necessary to wait and see whether this hypothesis will be confirmed in the next (few) elections.
- ⁹ In another study Pippa Norris modified this classification scheme to the following classes of decision-making: central bureaucratic, central patronage, local bureaucratic and local patronage (Norris 1996: 202–208).
- ¹⁰ According to this classification the candidate selection in Czech parties that secured a seat in the EP could be classified in the following manner: formal-centralised (SNK-ED, Nezávislí, ČSSD, ODS), formal-regionalised (KSČM), formal-local (KDU-ČSL).
- ¹¹ The term *volitel* is the Czech translation of the English term *selectorate*. We are aware that selection can also occur through appointment or approval of a pre-prepared list of candidates or other methods. In such a case the use of the term *selectorate* can be problematic.

- ¹² Magnus Blomgren attempted to resolve the difficulties of Rahat and Hazan's classification for multi-stage candidate selection; Blomgren differentiated three basic procedures in the process of candidate selection: nomination, selection and decision which may, according to Blomgren, overlap in some cases (this is often the case of selection and decision). Between these procedures there can be two mediation committees, which organise the following procedure and can make some decisions, for example the ranking of candidates (Blomgren 1999). Blomgren's model does not include two of Rahat and Hazan's variables, namely the restriction on candidacy and the election mechanism as such, which reduces the possibility to use his model for classifying candidate selection mechanisms.
- ¹³ Despite this KDU-ČSL nominated three non-party members for unelectable position on its ballot.
- ¹⁴ Table 1 shows only requirements stated in the nomination documents and thus does not include informal requirements placed on candidates by some parties. These include especially the habit of financially contributing to the party election campaign, which concerns primarily THE ODS.
- ¹⁵ A total of 13 candidates competed at the Convention; according to the rules of nomination delegates had three votes. In fact it was decided that each delegate would have four votes.
- ¹⁶ The importance of documents and written rules for analysing political parties and their organisation lies in the fact that (1.) they are intended to control and restrain clashes within parties (moreover, these rules are used by individual actors in struggle as sources of power); (2.) these rules contain normative ideas about party organisation; (3.) they reflect the distribution of power within a party and point to manner in which intra-party conflicts are resolved (any change in the distribution of power or an existing conflict may be reflected in the change of these rules) (for more see also Katz, Mair 1992b: 6–7).
- ¹⁷ The questionnaire survey among candidates for the European Parliament elections was organised by the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences CR under the leadership of Lukáš Linek and Lubomír Brokl in cooperation with Jan Outlý from Vysoká škola Jana Amose Komenského. The survey was conducted between 15. 5. 2004 and 15. 7. 2004. The questionnaire and other information on the research will be made available at the Internet website of the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences CR at <http://www.soc.cas.cz>. Candidates of seven parties were surveyed: ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM, ODS, ULD (Union of Liberal Democrats), SNK-ED (Association of Independent Candidates – European Democrats) and SZ (the Green Party).

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