Lodgaard, Sverre:

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world?

Routledge, 2011, pp. 263. ISBN: 978-0-415-58634-4

Reviewed by Ondřej Filipec

For more than half a century, the nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and disarmament has been a key issue of international security. The book reviewed is a very current and legible contribution to the ongoing debate about these important issues which are central to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Sverre Lodgaard, from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo, presents some current topics in the ongoing debate regarding non-proliferation and disarmament. Topically the book deals with international non-proliferation regimes and how to implement disarmament provisions. The book is divided accordingly to the topic into four balanced parts. The first part deals with power shifts in the context of nuclear weapons. The second part deals with the legacies of nuclear history.

The third part deals with proliferation problems and the role of disarmament and the final part about possibilities of nuclear-weapon free world.

The first part of the book examines the current military, economic and political status of the main nuclear powers and its implications for armament and disarmament in the context of systemic change. As US hegemony is challenged, the power shifts to the East and the South. The author examines US-EU relations under the Obama administration and claims that progress in disarmament affairs depends very much on accommodation with Russia. However, the primary focus of the US is now China. Regarding the position of Asian countries, strong economic growth has facilitated a strong growth of military budgets in India and China with regional consequences.

While the US and Russia have reduced their arsenals, Pakistan has responded by building more warheads (p. 25). As the power shift continues, India and China are increasingly able to pursue their national interests, bringing the US closer to cooperation with Japan and Australia. With the changing relations in Asia, the existing coalition against nuclear weapons states, which are not recognized under NPT is changing as well. With more economic ties between the South, we can expect more consultations. The role of China in future disarmament issues seems to be crucial. Despite the fact that nuclear weapons are a source of pride for the Chinese people, it seems that China is ready to provide a positive response to President Obama's call, because its superpower status is not dependent on nuclear weapons as in the case of other superpowers. However, until significant progress in reducing nuclear weapons is made by other powers, China will maintain a credible deterrent and India will hold its nuclear weapons in order to maintain a minimum deterrent (p. 37). However, it is likely that India would be able to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), if China and the US would do the same. To prevent nuclear testing is a key and logical precursor for the prevention of spread of nuclear weapons and thus deeper analysis of CTBT could well contribute to this issue and add another piece of puzzle to its complexity.

The second part of the book starts with a chapter examining four legacies of the Cold War. First, the recurrent

attempts at threat inflation and the corresponding politics of fear in both the US and the Soviet Union. Second, the Cold War produced a doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which was adapted, but in essence maintained. Third, an examination of the legacy of the Cold War and the enormous stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, which in many cases were left without adequate protection. And fourth, it is a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons left by superpower leaders (p. 44). This chapter about the first nuclear era is a logical step to another chapter dealing with post-Cold War doctrines, starting with theory about the functions of nuclear weapons and its implications for international relations and security. However, a very worthy contribution to the book is also the evolution of the nuclear doctrines of six nuclear states (the US, Russia, France, the UK, China and India) and the following analysis of impediments to disarmament. The author examines Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities in connection with disarmament, when transition from nuclear to conventional weapons could be a way to enhance US military superiority and add other concerns to existing fears. The author claims (p. 75), that Russia will certainly want to include PGS in the next round of US-Russian negotiations.

A separate chapter is dedicated to the global consensus on non-proliferation and disarmament. The End of the Cold War led to visions of nuclear disarmament when several states rolled back their nuclear programs, NPT member-

ship increased, its review conference had positive outcomes and the CTBT was in sight. However, the situation changed soon. States were wrong in natural expectations that significant reductions of arsenals would occur and a lack of consciousness contributed to unfulfilled opportunity to disarm, moreover India, Pakistan and North Korea tested, and maybe Iran is going nuclear. Sverre Lodgaard writes about how to re-establish a global consensus for disarmament in the context of the NPT.

Proliferation problems and the role of nuclear disarmament is the main topic of the third part of the book, which I personally consider a great contribution to the current knowledge. This part of the book is also valuable because it deals with nuclear countries outside the NPT, presents strategies on how to roll back countries to non-nuclear status and provides an overview about the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation. One of the chapters gives special focus on India and its nuclear capabilities, which are examined in consistence with the NPT. It seems that India is committed to the provisions of the NPT, except Article VI. The author discusses possibilities for India's disarmament embodied in US policies focusing on de jure recognition of India. As Pakistan is a key in this area, the NPT parties should encourage Pakistan to get similar standard as India. Another possibility seems to be a criteria-based approach built on similar elements highlighted by Nuclear Suppliers Group when exemptions were made for India.

Israel is in a different situation. As long as Israel does not admit to being a nuclear weapons state, there is no possible discussion of de jure recognition. The criteria-based approach represented by a US-India type deal seems to be not possible, because of the politics of opacity/ambiguity. Thus, the commitment to verification arrangements could be an expression of good will (p. 114). In this "three state problem" as the author describes the three NPT outsiders India, Pakistan and Israel, we can see the different status of these nuclear powers and similar logic for justification of their possession. It is a shame that this interesting contribution is centered on India and the current issue of the Iranian nuclear program is not examined in this three state problem. However, this small problem is adequately balanced by a separate chapter dedicated to Iran.

Before that, there is one more important contribution about rollback experiences. If proliferation is about moves towards weaponisation, rollback is the opposite process (p. 115). After an introduction of realist and idealist assumptions to proliferation and rollback, there is a quantitative analysis developed out of 36 historical examples (from which 27 states decided to give up weapons) with special focus on Iraq, Syria and Libya. As a result of this analysis, 16 strategies in support of rollback process might be introduced. It is important to note, that the strategies deal with both internal and external factors of proliferation. Moreover, proposed strategies might be developed in some future research and applied

on various states. The case of two — Iran and North Korea — are the subject of this book as well.

In the case of Iran, first both dimensions are discussed: internal, with a focus on oppositional nationalists and nuclear mythmakers and external, focusing mainly on US-Iran relations under the Obama administration, assessing US and Iranian strategies for conflict management. Another contribution deals with North Korea. A separate chapter is a well written overview of the history and negotiations of the North Korean nuclear program. The author examines various uses of the North Korean nuclear program for security, economic and political purposes, trying to explain state behavior. The last part devoted to North Korea deals with its current nuclear capacity and negotiation status. In this case as the author concludes, disarmament and rollback strategies are very limited and hardly applicable. The only relevant strategy seems to be the alleviation of security concerns, economic inducements, engagement with a view to gain leverage and to encourage openness or the role of the US and North Korea's neighbors (p. 163).

This third part of the book is summarized in the chapter addressing the political and military dimensions of the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation. A reader can find answers on several questions. First, how is disarmament important for non-proliferation? Second, how does non-proliferation matter for disarmament? Is it important for purposes of rollback? Does disarmament matter for North Ko-

ran and Iran? And how can non-nuclear-weapons states contribute to nuclear disarmament? The chapter is concluded with some recommendations, what can states do more and better, including preventing the spread of fuel-cycle facilities, improvements in safeguards and transparency, cutting back on extended deterrence, anchoring its commitments in national law, reserving the benefits of NPT or clarifying the right to withdraw from its commitments under international law.

The fourth part of the book "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world" deals with possible future disarmament and gives closer look at concrete propositions of "going to zero." The posed question is; what might a nuclear weapons free world look like? And what are the possibilities of the elimination of these weapons? The author suggests that there are many meanings of "zero," including the elimination of ready-made weapons, the elimination of weapon-grade fissile materials or to focus on capabilities to intercept a nuclear attack before the weapons reach their targets. Of course, an idea or vision cannot be reached without actions, which may include maintaining the principle of equity under various treaties, elimination of fissile materials, and elimination of nuclear-weapons infrastructure or to make peaceful uses of nuclear energy more proliferation resistant. The author discusses a multilateral phase of disarmament and suggests that from the early beginning, not only the five nuclear superpowers recognized under the NPT should be included, but that another three (India, Pakistan and Israel) should be included as well. There seems to be problems with two countries, with different logic for maintaining nuclear weapons. For Israel, nuclear weapons are a matter of regional security and thus they are tied to the Middle East peace process. In North Korea, there is still a possibility that Pyongyang will trade its nuclear weapons for economic assistance and normalization with the US and its neighbors (p. 214). Despite the growing economic interdependence, the danger of nuclear weapons use is higher in South Asia and the Middle East (p. 221), because economic interdependence is not translated into political interaction, as for example in Europe.

As disarmament and non-proliferation are very complex security and political

issues, the realities have to be simplified to be better dealt with and understood. This highly readable book contributes to a large extent to understanding the realities of these complex relations among nuclear powers in the light of disarmament and non-proliferation. The author is aware of the absence of assessing the threat posed by non-state actors in this book, however, as long as states are the only owners of nuclear weapons and its leaders are the main actors in the field of disarmament, this small shortcoming in the analysis is negligible. The book will be of great interest to all students of international relations/security, war and conflict studies, experts and professionals in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation.