Nationalism, Identity and Scotland’s Referendum

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Abstract: This article examines the referendum that was held on September 18, 2014 in Scotland. The referendum asked a simple question, “Should Scotland be an independent country.” Although the No vote prevailed, pro-independence support reached its highest point in recent history. The outcome of the referendum is examined in relation to the politics of identity. In particular, the decline in British identification among some parts of the electorate. Voters with a strong Scottish identity and weak British identity were significantly more likely to support independence. However, voting patterns were also substantively shaped by economic factors.

Keywords: Nationalism, identity politics, Scottish referendum, SNP, UK constitution

Introduction

On September 18, 2014, the Scottish electorate went the polls to decide whether to dissolve what has been called one of the most successful political unions in history: the 307 year old union with England. The developments that brought the United Kingdom to the brink of dissolution occurred relatively rapidly and the outcome remained unpredictable up to the day of the vote. Although the No vote ultimately prevailed, the Yes campaign witnessed an unprecedented increase in support for independence in the period leading up to the referendum. This shift in
opinion was largely unanticipated since the independence option has traditionally been supported by only one third of the Scottish electorate. As recently as 1979, the Scottish electorate failed to deliver enough support for even a modicum of devolved power that Westminster offered at that time. During the 1980s and 1990s then, the United Kingdom remained politically united, an archetypal unitary state. Much has changed in Scotland’s political landscape in the intervening years, however. Scotland’s parliament reconvened in 1999, with significant powers over domestic policy, and an historic referendum on independence followed. This article examines events that led to the shift in support for independence, and assesses the role played by nationalism and identity politics in this trend.

The Context of Scottish Nationalism and Identity

Max Weber noted that a nation is “a community of sentiment which would find its adequate expression only in a state of its own, and which thus normally strives to create one” (Beetham 1974: 122). Similarly, Ernest Gellner (1983: 1) stated that nationalism is, “...primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” Founded on a collective identity, rooted in the past, and reinforced by traditional symbols, the nation links people to a particular territory while distinguishing it from others (Ariely 2012). Historically, this shared sense of national identity played a crucial legitimizing role in the political unification of the state, particularly 18th and 19th Europe. However, questions continue to be raised as to whether nationalism remains relevant as a powerful political force. Hobsbawm (1992: 191) for instance, maintains that nationalism has become ‘historically less important’ and he predicts that its political influence will continue to decline. Others agree that nationalism is in decline, but they point to the homogenizing process of globalization as the culprit. Globalization reduces identification with the nation (Norris and Inglehart 2009), and, along with modernity, has brought about the collapse of a sense of community (Bauman 2001). Some disagree with these assertions, however. Tomlinson (2003) argues that primordial nationalism has increased rather than decreased as a result of globalization. While Bornman (2003: 3) highlights the propensity within globalization for “localisation, heterogeneity, differentiation, diversity and particularism.” Ethnic communities are perhaps the sole exemption to the disintegration of enduring communities in the globalising world (Bauman 1998).

Scottish nationalism does not easily fit within existing theoretical models of nationalism. It contains elements of primordial nationalism, with its long-held community traditions and symbolism, founded on an ethnic core. However, Scottish nationalism also reflects economic theories of nationalism that highlight the influ-
ence of uneven economic development, modernization, and relative deprivation. Although economic grievances alone may be insufficient in themselves to increase support for nationalist goals, increases in support are more likely to be sparked when economic grievances combine with rising expectations, which enable nationalist parties to offer a credible alternative to existing political arrangements (Esman 1977). From this perspective, it is not surprising that the Scottish National Party began making electoral gains following the discovery of oil in the North Sea.

Another complication in considering the nature of Scottish nationalism is the dual identities held by most Scots. When Scotland and England voluntarily joined their respective parliaments in 1707, Scotland retained a number of important civic institutions including its legal and education systems, as well as its Church, and system of local government. The retention of these important institutions encouraged the continuance of a separate Scottish civic and cultural identity. At the same time, Scots took pride in, and strongly supported, common British institutions, such as the National Health Service and the British Broadcasting Corporation, especially during the 20th century. Working class Scots also forged strong links with their trade union counterparts in other parts of the United Kingdom. Powerful British unions such as the National Union of Mineworkers and the Transport and General Workers Union, fostered a sense of solidarity among workers across all of Britain’s sub-national regions. Together these institutions reinforced a sense of Britishness, which formed the emotional glue that held the United Kingdom together (Curtice et.al. 2011). Such formal institutions were supplemented by strong cultural and familial ties that had built over centuries as populations migrated between Scotland and England. This sense of Britishness was reflected in support for the Conservative and Unionist Party in Scotland. In the 1955 general election for instance, the Conservative Party won a majority of the Scottish vote, as well as a majority of Scottish seats in Westminster. By contrast on the day that Scots went to the polls to participate in the referendum, the Conservative Party held only one Scottish seat in Westminster.

The Road to the Referendum

Trends in support for independence are reflected in support for the Scottish National Party (SNP). Although Scottish nationalism is certainly broader than the party, the SNP is the only party that has consistently advocated for independence over a period of decades. Founded in 1934, its electoral success has been limited until recently. In its first test, the 1935 general election, the SNP contested eight seats and won none. Ten years later the party won and then quickly lost its only seat. It was not until 1967 that the SNP breakthrough came with the election of its second Member of Parliament (MP). This win was noteworthy because it was not only unexpected,
it was achieved with the turnover of a very large Labour Party majority. The SNP quickly followed this victory by adding more MPs in 1970, and 1974, for a total of eleven members of the British Parliament. The electoral successes of the Scottish National Party put the issue of Scottish devolution firmly on the political agenda, and forced the Labour government to resurrect its old policy of Home Rule for Scotland (Keating 1998). In order to take effect the proposal would first be put to the Scottish electorate in a referendum held during 1979. The Yes vote garnered 52 percent of the vote but, as a result of the “40 percent rule” this was not enough for approval. The proposal required that at least 40 percent of the total electorate, not just those voting, support the measure. The vote fell short, and the plan was abandoned.

The failure of the devolution proposal undermined support for both the Labour Party and the SNP. Following a vote of ‘no confidence’ in the House of Commons, the Labour government was defeated in the 1979 general election by the Conservatives, led by Margaret Thatcher. The share of the vote that the SNP received declined sharply from 30 percent in 1974 to 17 percent in 1979. With the staunchly pro-unionist Thatcher as Prime Minister, it appeared that the issue was dead. Indeed, in contrast to most European governments at the time the Thatcher government set out to centralize political power, “to discredit and emasculate local government and to abolish dissident layers of municipal and regional elected authorities at a rate that was unprecedented in British peacetime” (Macmillan 1996, 78). The introduction of the Community Charge, commonly known as the poll tax, was of particular significance in Scotland. The poll tax was introduced in Scotland one year before it was launched in other parts of the UK, and it spawned mass protests, as well as the formation of an Anti-Poll Tax Union that advocated for non-payment of the tax. The poll tax, as well as other economic reforms that reduced support for social programs and for ailing industries, made the Conservative Party extremely unpopular in Scotland. However, given the population differences between Scotland and England, the Conservative Party continued to be elected to Westminster largely on the English vote.

Despite Thatcher’s attempts to quash the issue of devolution (and some would say because of), a resurgence of nationalist sentiment reappeared during the late 1980s in a document titled the ‘Claim of Right for Scotland.’ It was formulated by a non-party group of prominent Scots who called for the re-establishment of a Scottish parliament. The Conservative government, now led by John Major, however resolutely refused to address the devolution issue, despite the fact that this position carried a heavy electoral price. During the 1997 election, the Conservative Party lost every seat that it held in Scotland. That same election brought the Labour Party back in control of the UK government.

The Labour government quickly fulfilled its pre-election pledges by passing devolution legislation for Scotland and Wales. As before, these proposals would take effect with the approval of the majority of voters, but this time without the 40 percent
rule. In Scotland the ballot contained two questions. The first question referred to the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, the second to whether that Parliament should have the option of varying taxation by 3 percent above or below levels in the rest of the UK. Both questions were heavily favored by the Scottish electorate, with an affirmative vote of 74.3 percent and 63.5 percent respectively. The vote led to the successful passage of the Scotland Act 1998, which provided for the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament with significant powers. It transferred control over a range of domestic policy including, education, health, local government and economic development, to Scotland, while reserving areas such as national security, foreign affairs, energy and macro-economic planning to Westminster. Elections for the new Scottish Parliament were held one year later on May 6, 1999. The Labour Party won 56 seats in the new parliament, followed by the SNP with 35 seats, and the Conservatives with 18 seats. Paradoxically, the Scottish Conservative Party has found more success in the Scottish Parliament than in Westminster because of the different electoral systems in each parliament. Westminster MPs are elected by a ‘first-past the post’ system, whereas Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSP’s) are elected by a first-past-the-post system, as well as the proportional Additional Member system. The latter provides greater opportunities for third parties to gain seats.

Although the SNP did not attract enough support in 1999 to obtain a majority of seats in parliament, party leaders nevertheless viewed the re-establishment of Scotland’s Parliament as an important step in the path towards independence, or at a minimum, further devolution. That optimism appeared well-founded when the SNP became the largest party in the Scottish Parliament in 2007, gaining just one more seat than the Labour Party. More dramatic however, was the 2011 election for the Scottish Parliament when the SNP gained enough seats to form a majority government. This turn of events was not anticipated since the mixed proportional representation electoral system was specifically designed to prevent the dominance of a single party. Although positive for the SNP, this result did not necessarily mean that the Scottish electorate had become pro-independence however. Polling suggests that increased support for the SNP at that time was based on the “most mundane of electoral reasons: most voters thought that it would do a better job in office than its rivals” (Johns et. al.). As a minority governing party, the SNP had allayed fears by demonstrating that is was competent and by implementing popular policies. The positive view of the SNP government was confirmed in public opinion polling. In the 2011 Social Attitudes survey 71 percent of people said they trusted the Scottish Government to act in Scotland’s best interests ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time,’ which was an increase of 10 points since 2010. At the same time, attitudes to the UK Government remained more negative. In the same survey, only 18 percent of respondents said that they trusted the UK government to act in Scotland’s best interests ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time.’ (Scottish Government 2012).
Despite the lack of a clear pro-independence mandate, the SNP remained true to its core objective in pursuing a referendum on independence. To do so, some legal and political questions had to be addressed. The 1998 Scotland Act gave the Scottish Parliament power over everything except those powers reserved to Westminster, or matters that substantially relate to reserved powers. The UK government took the position that the potential dissolution of the union did indeed substantially relate to reserved powers, and therefore authority to hold a referendum on independence was beyond the powers of the Scottish Parliament. At the same time, Westminster recognized, with the election of a majority SNP government, that there was an electoral mandate for a referendum. The UK government therefore agreed to extend the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament in order to allow a legal referendum to take place, and preclude likely legal challenges. Political negotiations proceeded, and centered on the referendum question, or questions.

The SNP initially lobbied against a straight binary choice, independence or the status quo, seeking instead to include a third option in the referendum known as devolution max. Devo-max, as it became known, has been defined in a number of ways, but the SNP made its definition clear in a 2009 document,

Devolution max — full fiscal autonomy within the UK — would make the Scottish Parliament and government responsible for raising, collecting and administering all (or the vast majority of) revenues in Scotland and the vast majority of spending in Scotland… In essence, this framework is the maximum form of tax and policy devolution, short of independence. This option broadly reflects the system in Spain for the Basque Country and Navarre. (Scottish Government 2009 para 4.22–4.24).

The SNP leadership was understandably eager to include a third question, since polls consistently showed that a majority of the electorate wanted Scotland to remain part of the UK, but that additional devolution was popular, see Figure 1.
The SNP reasoned that if the independence vote failed, then at least the Scottish government could be granted significant additional powers. As Jeffrey (2009) points out, party leadership was willing to accept devo-max as the second-best option because it would bring almost identical benefits to the Scottish nation. British Prime Minster, David Cameron however, was also aware of the polling data and refused to concede on the third option. "What we have is what I always wanted, which is one single question, not two questions, not devo max, a very simple single question Scottish independence referendum deal signed by Cameron and Salmond." The final deal, known as the Edinburgh Agreement, asked a straightforward question, “Should Scotland be an independent country” and the referendum was set for September 18, 2014. When all votes were tallied in a remarkable 84 percent turnout, the final result was 45 percent in favor of independence, while 55 percent voted against. Although the Yes campaign ultimately failed in achieving its principal objective, the percentage of the Scottish electorate who voted in favor of independence reached its highest point in recent history. Support for independence was ten percentage points higher than its previous high watermark, which was reached in 2005.
The Referendum and National Identity

In addition to demographic and economic factors that shaped voting patterns in the referendum, polls identified a strong correlation between people's sense of national identity and how they voted. Identity politics alone cannot explain the outcome of the referendum, but feelings of ‘Scottishness’ provided a powerful boost to the Yes campaign. No less than 88 percent of those who said they felt ‘Scottish and not British’ voted Yes, compared to only 26 percent who felt ‘Equally British and Scottish’ (Curtice 2014).

Unfortunately, it is not possible to chart a long time-series of British identity, because a sense of British identity was largely taken for granted by early survey researchers (Sundas and Heath 2013). Only in recent years, as support for devolution increased, has the measurement of national identity become a matter of academic and government research. Available data shows that there has been a decline in British identity and a corresponding increase in separate English and Scottish identities since the end of the 20th century.

Table 1: National Identity in Scotland and England: 1992–2010 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Scottish not British</th>
<th>Equally Scottish and British</th>
<th>English not British</th>
<th>Equally English and British</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Sundas and Heath (2013)

Table 1 indicates that there was a 20 percent increase in those identifying as Scottish only and an 11 percent increase in those identifying as English only over the period measured. It also reveals a decline in dual identity in both Scotland and England, by 13 percent and 7 percent respectively. The strength of Scottish identification is confirmed by more recent polling. In December 2013, 54 percent of respondents in Scotland identified themselves as either Scottish only, or more Scottish than British. By contrast, 27 percent identified as equally Scottish and British (Curtice 2014). The decline in feelings of Britishness is more pronounced in ‘forced choice’ national identity questions, which were more common in earlier polling. In 1979 for in-
stance, 39 percent of Scots identified themselves as British first, by 2011 that figure had dropped to just 15 percent (Curtice et. al. 2013).

There are both long-term and short-term reasons for the decline in British identification and dual identity among Scots. Long-term factors include the declining legitimacy of the British state. The UK was formed largely in response to external events (Colley 1994). For Scotland, union with England provided tremendous opportunities for trade and economic expansion. Almost overnight, Scotland became part of, and helped to forge, the world’s largest empire. For England, union with Scotland provided increased security to the north, it finally closed the door to French ambitions, and it settled problematic succession questions. As Scotland’s leading Historian, Tom Devine stated, “The union of England and Scotland was not a marriage based on love. It was a marriage of convenience. It was pragmatic. From the 1750s down to the 1980s there was stability in the relationship. Now, all the primary foundations of that stability have gone or been massively diluted.”2 Devine identifies the underpinnings of British identity that have weakened as: the declining adherence to Protestantism as a unionist ideology, the declining primacy of English and imperial markets, the loss of 12 Scottish regiments since 1957 that loosened military ties, the weakening influence of the monarch, and the absence of an external hostile force that once induced a sense of collective solidarity.

The waning of British identity has also been strongly influenced by more recent economic factors that played a role in increasing support for the SNP in the early 1970s, and for subsequently altering the devolution debate. In 1970, vast oil fields were discovered in the North Sea, much of which would have been located in Scottish territorial waters had Scotland been an independent state. The SNP quickly took advantage of this discovery in their new slogan “Its Scotland’s Oil,” a tactic that brought electoral success. The party returned its greatest ever number of MPs to the British Parliament in 1974. Just as important were the economic and political factors that coalesced during the 1980s and 1990s to strengthen support for greater autonomy for Scotland. Especially influential were the policies pursued by the UK government under Margaret Thatcher and her successor John Major. Not only did the Conservative government reject the idea of devolution, it also began to test unpopular neoliberal policies in Scotland. In the first two years of the Thatcher administration Scotland lost one fifth of its workforce, as the government prioritized inflation control and advanced that policy through cuts in public spending, privatization, and the deliberate weakening of trade union bargaining power. These polices hit the north of Britain particularly hard (including England) and it became increasingly apparent that regional economic divisions between the north and the south-east of Britain were widening. At the same time, Scotland’s rejection of the Conservative Party had little impact within the British political system because of its much smaller electorate; as a result, an increasing number of Scots began to feel
disenfranchised. Interestingly, the mistakes of the Thatcher and Major governments were later recognized by David Cameron when he became leader of the Conservative Party in 2006, “a series of blunders were committed in the 1980s and 1990s… to treat Scotland as a laboratory for experimentation in new methods of local government finance was clumsy and unjust… to have fought devolution for so long was another bad idea.”

Although anger over Westminster policies has been evident in the Scottish electorate for decades, the SNP has had difficulty translating this dissatisfaction into support for independence. As Figure 1 indicated above, support for devolution has been considerably higher than support for independence. The SNP has found it especially challenging to win over Labour Party supporters who traditionally voted on the basis of class, but the failure of the Labour Party to find ‘unionist’ solutions to the post-industrial social dislocation that impacted working class communities has undermined traditional solidarities. This decline in support for the Labour Party is mirrored in shrinking support for all of the UKs major parties. The UK now has one of the lowest rates of party membership in Europe, and the steepest decline. Less than 1 percent of the electorate now belongs to one of the three main parties. On the other hand, the British Social Attitudes Survey shows that Britons are more politically active and interested in politics than they were 50 years ago, but their loyalties have shifted to smaller parties, such as the Greens, the Scottish Nationalists, and more recently the UK Independence Party (Greene 2014).

Despite the decline in traditional class-based voting in UK elections, results in the Scottish referendum highlighted some significant socio-economic distinctions. No less than 65 percent of those living in the bottom fifth of Scotland’s most deprived neighborhoods voted Yes, compared with just 36 percent of those in the top fifth of most affluent neighborhoods. Moreover, nothing correlated more strongly with the level of Yes support in each council area than the level of unemployment. In those areas with relatively high unemployment, Yes support averaged 51 percent, in those areas with low levels of unemployment it was just 39 percent (Curtice 2014). The Yes vote was highest in districts where support for the Labour Party has been traditionally strong, a clear rejection of the party’s pro-unionist stance. The SNP has also found increasing electoral success in traditional Labour Party strongholds by advocating well-defined social democratic principles. As Tomlinson (2014: 176) points out, the SNP became “unashamedly ideological; it would embrace the growth of the public sector as part of a positive-sum social settlement, in which high levels of employment in health, social care and education are celebrated simultaneously fulfilling popular demands for such services and also compensating for the absence of private sector job creation.”

This decidedly left of center policy stance aligns with the general sentiments of the Scottish electorate. Though differences should not be overstated, people in Scotland
tend to be more social democratic than those in England. Scots are more likely to agree that government should redistribute wealth than do people in England. They are also more supportive of ‘tax and spend’ policies than their counterparts in England. In 2010, 40 percent said that taxes and spending should be increased, compared with only 30 per cent of those in England (Curtice et al. 2013). This social democratic outlook traditionally translated into support for the Labour Party, and it was counter to Scottish Nationalism. As Gallagher (1991, 114) pointed out more than twenty years ago, the structure of the Scottish economy “may have created a culture of dependency resistant to the nationalist project which could easily be depicted as entailing a great deal of risk and uncertainty.” He also described the Scottish working class as ‘a sleeping political giant’ that refuses to waken up and flex its collective muscles. The results of the 2014 referendum however, suggest that the risk averse tendencies that have historically characterized the Scottish working class are now weakening.

Economic inequality connects to nationalism because it affects social identities directly, through perceptions of exclusion and inclusion. These become particularly salient when they are associated with ethnic or regional distinctions, as such spatial elements of identity can form the basis of grievance and provoke strong exclusive cleavages (Taylor-Gooby 2013). This link between nationalism and distributive politics is widely recognized. In a large cross-national study, Shayo (2009) demonstrated that support for nationalism strongly correlates with inequality. Poorer people tend to be the most nationalistic, and this is especially strong in unequal societies. With regards to Scotland, Niedzwiedz and Kandlik-Eltanani (2014) found that individuals who agree that income inequality is too high within the United Kingdom were more likely to support independence compared to those who disagreed or held a neutral opinion. The authors hypothesize that people who value a more equal society support independence because they believe that “the Scottish Government would be in a better position to be able to alter mechanisms that could have the potential to reduce social inequalities” (Niedzwiedz and Kandlik-Eltanani 2014: 49.) Maclean and Thomson (2014: 145) confirm the association between lower incomes and support for independence; “those in the lowest income quarter were more likely to have a stronger Scottish identity and weaker British identity … From their standpoint, any realignment of the established order is unlikely to worsen their relative economic standing, therefore the downside risks of constitutional change are minimised.” By contrast, individuals with higher incomes tend to be more risk averse since they have more to lose. This is particularly true of those in professional occupations, who perceive greater economic threat from independence than individuals at the same income level, but from other occupations (Kopasker 2014).

Perceptions of fairness also impact support or independence. In Scotland large numbers of people believe that England benefits disproportionately from the union.
In 2014 one-third of Scots said that England’s economy benefits more, whereas only 18 percent believed that the Scottish economy benefits more from the union (ScotCen 2014). Perhaps not surprisingly, English and Scottish views diverge on this issue. An increasing number of English people think that Scotland gets more than its ‘fair share’ of public spending, a response that has more than doubled in the last decade. This trend has been accompanied by growing numbers in England who say that devolution has had a negative impact on the government of Britain (Jones, Lodge, Henderson and Wincott 2012). It appears then that devolution has not only shaped Scottish identity, it has also strengthened and politicized English identity. Although a majority of English people still retain dual identities, the English component of that identity is increasingly becoming the primary source (Jones et. al. 2012).

Conclusion

That the United Kingdom came close to the brink of dissolution would have been inconceivable only a few decades ago. From the Union of Parliaments in 1707 to the second half of the 20th century, the UK was politically an entrenched unitary state. Although Scotland remained culturally distinct, British identity was fostered by shared struggles against external enemies, as well as common British institutions. These were the bonds that held the union together. The process of de-industrialization however, accelerated by Thatcherism, undermined solidarity among British workers and bolstered nationalism. At the same time, support for British political parties diverged in England and Scotland. While Scots overwhelmingly voted for Labour Party candidates, the Conservative Party frequently secured the reins of power in Westminster based on the English vote. This perceived democratic deficit generated calls for constitutional change in the form of a devolved parliament, which ultimately culminated in an independence referendum.

Support for independence is closely tied to Scottish identity, but explanations for why millions of Scots voted Yes are multifaceted and complex. While those with a more singular Scottish identity were significantly more likely to support independence, this was heavily influenced by economic factors. Scots who had the least to lose economically were more willing to assume the risk of dramatic political change. In the referendum, class and nationalist perspectives combined, and for lower-income individuals, they were mutually reinforcing. As Gellner notes, “the ‘classes’ that really matter are those which are produced by uneven development; and they attain ‘consciousness’ through ethnicity” (Gellner 1978, 109). The referendum was not all about identity, but in recent years identity politics has clearly intensified in Scotland. This broadening appeal of Scottish nationalism contradicts theoretical perspectives.
that assume nationalism will not survive in the modern era. It also undermines arguments that point to the inevitable homogenizing influence of globalization.

Although nationalists did not achieve their core objective, support for independence in the referendum reached its highest point in recent history, buoyed by a positive Yes campaign and the emergence of grass-roots activism that engaged many voters. Prime Minster David Cameron may be correct in asserting that, “The debate has been settled for a generation ... There can be no disputes, no re-runs. We have heard the settled will of the Scottish people,”4 but similar predictions have been made in the past. A devolved parliament was supposed to “kill nationalism stone dead,”5 which obviously did not occur. That devolution is a process, not an event, is further evidenced by the negotiations that began immediately after the referendum to grant new powers to the Scottish Parliament. While the end point remains unknown, it is clear that there has been a sea change in Scottish politics that will have far reaching constitutional implications for Scotland, as well as for the rest of the UK. The British state is currently experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, or as Welsh First Minster declared one day after the Scottish referendum, “the old union is dead. We need to forge a new one”6.

Notes


References


